X-Message-Number: 10186 Date: Thu, 06 Aug 1998 00:28:38 -0700 From: Brian Manning Delaney <> Subject: Re: validation of values References: <> I enjoyed Peter Merel's reflections; they highlight a big part of what I take to be the problem here. Robert Ettinger has made a nice summary of some of his views. I disagree with just about everything he says :) -- but a lengthy continuation of this discussion, as Brook pointed out, may not belong here on Cryonet (or in Sci.life-extension) (I tend to jump into these discussions once someone else has started them, hoping to help resolve things -- however much I fail. Hmm... well, in truth, resolution is probably not what I'm really after -- though trying to help is certainly what I'm after). This will be my last message on the topic (most likely...) >1. Demanding a definition of "happiness" really >misses the point. Happiness (satisfaction, feel-good) >is not to be defined, but studied. It is not a >matter of language, but of biology. We talk >about it initially in necessarily vague terms, >to be sharpened as we learn more. There are two ways you could mean this. In general, it's quite right to say that a poorly understood (or even nearly but not quite perfectly understood) phenomenon shouldn't be expected to be defined perfectly at the outset. After all, something we're studying is something we don't understand, and therefore can't yet define: we need to learn more about it first. So you have a very important point, if that's what you mean. But that can't be, or shouldn't be, what your point is in its entirety. That's because our primary goal isn't to understand happiness; rather, it's to figure out what we (or what one or what you or what I) should do. Happness comes in as part of the definition of what our goal should be. You can't answer a What is? question about something with another thing about which the What is? question can't be (or won't be) answered. Or, perhaps more importantly: you do, it seems, have to define what you mean by happiness, even if part of what you think about happiness is that we have more to learn about it. Here I just mean define in the sense of pointing to, as in: "this thing here, with what looks like aspects X and Y, is what I want to understand more." You seem not to view these objections as serious problems. That's understandable. I think, basically, what you mean is this: we already know, biologically, enough about what happiness is that what we need to do is more biology (and more of related sciences) to learn more about it. But then, rather than demand a definition of happiness, I'll demand justification for the claim that the question is a matter of biology. You haven't given one yet. I believe you can't give such a justification, for the simple reason that the claim isn't justified. >2. Nevertheless, the essence of feel-good is >intuitively obvious, if we don't let our >sophistication get in the way. The phrase "let our sophistication get in the way" -- something I hear often -- rings alarm bells for me. A higher degree of sophistication is precisely what we need, I contend. >We are talking about >subjective conditions (qualia), caused by (rather, >equivalent to) objective states or events in the >brain. "Caused by" and "equivalent to" are two radically different things, a difference which matters here. I don't see how you can equate them, or imply that either formulation will work in your argument. Let's leave that aside. More importantly: try proving that subjective conditions are caused by (or that they're equivlent to) states or events in the brain. Plenty of smart people have tried, and they always fail. One problem is giving a rigorous definition of "inside" the brian. Cranium? Nervous system? Is my computer part of brain, in a relevant way? My friends? "No, of course not!" one wants to say. Yet the physical correlate of psychic activity is very difficult to locate. This is precisely because the psychic isn't a matter of "physics". The biggest problem, though, is that the science on which claims about the relation between brain states (or anything physical) and qualia rest is not supported by philosophy. You say in #5 that all questions are scientific (our most fundamental difference, perhaps). This means that the justification for using the scientific method for establishing the relation between brain states and qualia is itself scientific. But, of course, one can't use science to justify the use of science. It's like: "Why do you believe in astrology?" "Because astrology says I should believe in astrology." Such an attitude is neither philosophical nor scientific, but religious. >We all know there are "good" qualia and "bad" >qualia. The most basic value or goal is to >create or increase a preponderance of good >qualia or feel-good or satisfaction. You've said this repeatedly. I still see no justification for it (unless "basic goal" is just "what we do," in which case there's the circularity problem with respect to means, as I pointed out -- and of course, again, the use of science in elucidating our goal needs to be justified). This is a more important problem than the one about showing that happiness is a matter of biology, which, with a certain (perhaps not very useful) definition of happiness, might be possible. >3. Philosophers often claim it is impossible to >derive an "ought" from an "is." (I think Brian >agrees with that.) No, I think we probably _can_ derive an Ought from an Is, but not from a scientific Is. I thought we were talking about Oughts at the level of basic values, not means. If we're talking about means, and not basic values, then _of course_ an Ought can be derived from an Is. Your example here doesn't address basic values -- >I can't quickly prove my >claim that we can always derive "ought" from "is," >but I can quickly disprove the philosophers' >claim that we never can--because I only need one >counterexample. >Consider an ordinary person in ordinary >circumstances. He wants to maintain good health >for an extended period. To do so he needs to eat >a reasonably well balanced diet. Hence he "ought" >to do so, and want to do so. The Ought in question is wanting good health for an extended period, not the eating of the balanced diet. The diet is just a means, and that will depend, obviously, upon the physical world (this scientific Is). Wanting good health for an extended period isn't derived from an Is -- _unless_, of course, it's _not_ a basic value, in which case it likely is derived from an Is (the Is of the fallibility of one's body, which needs to be taken into account to achieve one's true goal of writing 5 novels, for example, itself a goal not derivable from a scientific Is, unless, of course...). You're thus not speaking to the issue, unless I'm missing something. >At the base of the pyramid (or inverted pyramid), >the most basic values must stand on their own. I >have already said the most fundamental value(s) >can be found in feel-good. It is irrelevant that >we do not yet know anything about the anatomy/physiology >of qualia; we have every reason to presume we >will learn. And once again, if anyone questions >this position, his challenge is to offer >something different. I don't think that's THE challenge at all, though it's _a_ challenge. The challenge for someone who disagrees is simply to show that you have no warrant for your claim. I've done this. (Or at least shown that you haven't given a warrant yet.) But it certainly would be helpful to offer an alternative, I agree! I don't have a good one, yet. For now, mine is simply: Our basic value OUGHT to be to figure out the best basic value. (I don't have a great justification for this yet, but what I do have would take us too far afield.) >(To my knowledge, no one has ever offered a >genuine alternative to determinism either, but >that is another long story.) (Personally, I don't think anyone has ever offered a genuine philosophical determinism -- though in the sphere of physics, I'm actually more deterministic than most: dice-throws in the world science studies have never made sense to me.) >4. Part of Brian's problem seems to be the >concept of maximization in the context of a >limitless future etc. Again, this is just a >matter of common-sense manipulation of >probability calculations. We weight more heavily >the consequences that are closer in time and >space and more amenable to estimation. The best >you can do is the best you can do. It makes no >sense to fail to try, just because you know your >competence is limited. You seem to have missed my point entirely, though it's likely my fault: the point was a complicated one, and expressed in a somewhat compressed way. (By the way, "common-sense" is another alarm-ringer for me.) My first, not so important point was that the best we can do in a limitless universe can be shown to be not just possibly sub-optimal, that is, less than what an omniscient being would achieve, etc., but actually WORTHLESS. The point that followed from this wasn't at all that it makes no sense to try. Rather, the point that followed is that the employment of the notion of outcome calculation may not work in an attempt to ground a notion of an Ought. No matter, we can drop this one. The second, more important (and difficult) point was that, even if we can differentiate between better and worse estimations of infinite consequences (on our happiness or whatever), the relation between an estimation and the actuality of how things turn out is such that we're led into a contradiction. (This was my point about the difference between (S1) "The right thing to do is to make choices that maximize happiness," and (S2) "The right thing to do is to make choices that we assess as having the best chance of maximizing happiness.") I'll not restate, unless it wasn't clear. (Actually, near the end of yesterday's post, putting a 'that' after the 'yet' in the paragraph beginning "With #S2, you..." might make the point slightly clearer.) >5. Brian says the definition of happiness is not >a scientific question, and mentions mind vs. >brain. My position (and in this, for a change, I >am far from alone) is that mind is just an >aspect of the brain or its functions, and that >ALL questions are scientific questions, if we >define "science" in an appropriately broad way. It seems to me that we would have to define "science" so broadly that it would no longer correlate at all with how we normally use the word. That is, it would be more like philosophy. But you're not willing to take the definition to that level of generality, it seems, since you don't see the need to justify the use of science (the less general cognitive science or neurology) in answering the question about our basic values. Philosophy (unless you're redefining that, too) would demand precisely such a justification. I don't see what intermediate level of generality you mean, nor what level of generality is workable in helping you make your point. It seems our worldviews are radically different. Yours is, in certain respects, much more contemporary than mine. In other ways, though, it's goes back to the beginning of the Enlightenment, when it was thought, at first by a few, but then by many, than science would be able to solve _everything_ (I'm not saying this is precisely your view). My own view of things includes a counter-Enlightenment aspect (though also adheres to the spirit of the Enlightenment): science can do a lot, but can't answer everything. Above all, it can't answer the fundamental question of our times: why science? (This point actually goes way, way back to Plato.) As Nietzsche says: our highest values (like Enlightenment values) are de-valuing themselves, though it will take a while for people to see this. Through no special talent, but mere chance, it seems, I've come to see the importance of Nietzsche: I fell in love with a brilliant poet/theologian who eventually convinced me that my "scientism" (which was _extreme_) was unfounded. One gets used to answering the question Why science? with a "What else is there?" or "It works" or "Give me a better alternative," and imagines that those answers suffice, that they're "good enough" (after all, what other answer is there?...). It's hard to see just how meaningless these answers are. Another ex. I've given before: you ask pragmatists why they believe in pragmatism, and they answer: "it works". This is not an answer. Authentic Socratic Eros certainly helped me. I highly recommend it. We all have blind spots, though, of course! I'll gladly accept recommendations myself! >What do you know--I have provided cosmic >enlightenment in less than two pages! They say a high estimation of one's worth correlates with a long life. I think you will live a long life, and that you _ought to_ live a long life! Best wishes, Brian. P.S., in brief: Brook Norton writes: > So long as I'm happy, give me the drug. > I'd rather be dumb-happy than smart-sad. This highlights that one's own goal is what needs to be determined, not The Goal, for I can't imagine _ever_ wanting such a drug. However, there almost certainly are some universals among us, as far as goals go. I suspect it could be shown that you _shouldn't_ want such a drug, because the state it induces produces conditions which contradict the conditions for the possibility of determining that you should want the drug in the first place. But explaining that would take pages. -- Brian Manning Delaney <> Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=10186