X-Message-Number: 11102
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 1999 16:43:29 -0700
From: Mike Perry <>
Subject: Re: CryoNet #11083 - #11096

Brook Norton, #11093
>
>To Mike Perry, It seems on the one hand you argue that an extremely
>unlikely event should be discounted, and on the other hand that an
>extremely unlikely event must be considered...

Yes, there are times to do both, i.e. one or the other approach is called
for. For example, if we are wondering about bare possibilities and not
concerned about the relative likelihood of these possibilities, we consider
the unlikely events. Winning the state lottery is possible in this sense,
and we do consider it, since we even see it happen. But it is unlikely, and
I wouldn't attempt to build my fortune based on this possibility, i.e. I
would not purchase a state lottery ticket as a strategy to improve my income.

Quantum events whose cumulative probablity is small but nonzero do make for
interesting speculations, and sometimes are worth considering too, but we
shouldn't take them too seriously. So, while it is possible that a random
letter generator (based ultimately on quantum events) could appear to
converse intelligently with you for a long time and be both intelligent and
emotive, it would happen so rarely that, in a practical sense, this slim
possibility would not by itself overturn the Turing Test. (A better chance
would be had by a basically dumb but interactive, conversation program with
some rudimentary "intelligence" and some randomizing features--but even here
the probability is small.)  The Turing Test--whatever you make of it--must
be judged on statistical terms and not on the principle that it is
invalidated if it ever fails even once.

As for my book, thanks for your interest, sorry for the delay, I'm working
on it!
 
I also want to address some points raised by Bob Ettinger, #11095

>(A preliminary aside: the uploaders, of whom I get the impression Mr. Strout
>is one, go further. They claim that you are essentially an abstraction, your
>essence being in information and its processing. Although a physical
>instantiation is necessary for implementation, any medium will do; isomorphism
>is everything. Thus "you" or partly-you could "live" in countless forms
>simultaneously.

This is my view.

> [Aside to the aside: David Deutsch claims a Turing "universal"
>computer is not really universal, because it is classical rather than quantum,

>and would take longer than the age of the universe to do quantum >computations.
>This suggests (cf. Penrose) that a classical computer could not be a person,
>even if the other objections did not exist.])  
>

Well, if we are going to be immortal, our age must eventually exceed the
10-20 billion years now conjectured for the universe, so even very slow
computations could have relevance. In practical terms, the idea of emulating
a person on a Turing machine or a real, classical computer may be a
non-starter, in view of the complexity. But I think it still at least has
theoretical signifcance, in that it says something about what "personhood"
really is, at a deep level, i.e. it is computational in nature.

...

>Third, we can go back to the most obvious problem--an instant show-stopper >for
>most people, as someone on this list recently remarked . "I am HERE; that
>person over THERE, no matter how similar, must be someone else. If a bee
>stings him, I will not feel it, even though I may empathize. If he dies, I
>still live and do not feel diminished. If I am about to die, the prospect of
>him living on will not console me."
>

My point of view on this is that "I" am not a localized phenomenon but
extend, more or less equally, to *all* sufficiently similar constructs (e.g.
in parallel universes). I can't say "I'm HERE" and mean any specific thing,
because my doubles (by definition) are doing the same thing too (where is
HERE?). Like in a house of mirrors, only then there is always one "real" you
with all the rest being reflections only. This is not the case with true
duplicates, all of whom must be more or less equally "real." If a bee stings
one or some of these duplicates but not all, at that point a fissioning
takes place. "I" split into two or more separate persons. Each of these
"persons" in turn will in general be a family of duplicates, not just one
instantiation. As for death, well, there is a certain probability that I
will die, but not a certainty, based on what happens to the various
duplicates. And so on.

Following George Smith, #11091, I also find it of interest whether a given
poster is signed up for cryonic suspension. 

Mike Perry
Alcor cryonic suspension member

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