X-Message-Number: 11164
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 1999 01:49:23 -0700
From: Mike Perry <>
Subject: Re: CryoNet #11150 - #11158

Thomas Donaldson, #11151, writes
>To Mike Perry:
>
>I'm not at all clear on just what you mean. Are you saying that a
>duplicate which also had some kind of immediate nervous connection (say,
>one brain with 2 bodies???) would be "the same" as the original?

No. I am referring (in #11149) to two identical constructs that have
no connections but are still functioning (for a time, say) in identical ways.
Admittedly a highly improbable situation in our single universe (but more
plausible across parallel universes, assuming they exist). Improbable, that is,
unless persons can be uploaded into predictably functioning devices
(see my posting, #11155). Otherwise, I agree with you, that an attempt 
to make two individuals exacly alike would, at best, result in persons 
that would diverge very quickly. Still
the issue of the hypothetical exactly functioning duplicate has 
philosophical significance (and, I contend, can affect such issues
as whether a person signs up for cryonics). But see my further comments 
below.

Bob Ettinger, #11154, writes

>Mike Perry (#11149) writes:  
>
>>An identical construct THERE (running through identical states, etc.)
>>should feel whatever is felt HERE--thus you would have one shared
>>consciousness in two locations. I see no particular problem with that. The
>>"different entity" is not different at the level of personhood, only at a
>>lower, "instantiation" level.  
>
>I think, first, that some confusion may arise from the concept of "state"
>in quantum theory. The "state" of a hydrogen atom (e.g. ground state) does
>NOT fully specify its relation to the rest of the universe and possible
>interactions; location also plays a role. And two macroscopic objects at
>different locations cannot "run through identical states" because they are
>in different environments.  
>
As far as consciousness is concerned, I submit they can. We are talking
about a finite set of events, which would not involve interacting with
all the rest of the environment, whatever that may include. The local
environments
could be the same or equivalent, for the time interval we are talking
about. Two gas molecules in different locations can be in the
same quantum state (cf. Tipler, *The Physics of Immortality*, pp. 230-232).
Their states may well become different at some future time, but till then
they are unified. Similar considerations must apply to larger, still finite 
assemblages of particles, including humans in various settings, though the
probabilities may be very small. 

>Further, even if the two instantiations really were identical and remained
>that way, that still would not obviate the problem. They would, of course,
>"feel" the same things from the standpoint of an outside observer, who
>would describe their inner workings as identical. But this would not be
>"shared consciousness," in part because destruction or change of one (at a
>great distance, say) would not affect the other in any way. Duplicated
>consciousness is not the same as shared consciousness.  
>
In my view, duplicate consciousness *is* one and the same as shared
consciousness. If there is a difference, I submit it is a "non-reductionist"
sort of difference, a mystical notion, that I feel comfortable discounting.
As for the objection that "destruction or change of one ... would not
affect the other in any way" I handle that problem by allowing the
possibility of fissioning. One consciousness or one person can split. The
split would occur as soon as a difference develops in what was, up to
then, a subjectively identical experience in the two instantiations. Then 
you would no longer have shared consciousness. 

>But the main point remains that if you are a physical system, and not just
>an abstraction characterized by your information, then when the physical
>system is gone, you are gone, no matter how many other similar systems may
>exist or may later be created. The subject who feels is in the physical
>system, or IS (a part or aspect of) the physical system.  
>
Bob, I am really curious about your opinion on the following questions (which
somewhat recapitulate some of your thought experiments in *The Prospect
of Immortality*)--others of course also feel free to contribute.

1. Say it became possible, through some unexpected breakthrough, to
map the detailed, atomic structure of a solid object long before it was
possible to manipulate that structure, as might be needed to resuscitate
a cryonics patient. So as a precaution, a cryonics organization has all of
its patients mapped in this way and the information stored in a safe
place. Later still, a terrorist attack destroys all the patients and scatters
their atoms to the four winds. Later still, the information is used to create
exact, atom-for-atom duplicates, and these copy-patients are 
reanimated. Did the original people survive? 

2. Say you are in a coma for 30 years (something like Oliver Sacks' patients
in *Awakenings*). Then you are cured and fully functional again, with
no essential changes in personality, pretty much as if the previous 30 years
had all passed in one night. Even your aging process was not too extreme,
and you
are physically much like your younger self. However, due to normal metabolism
during that time, most of the actual atoms in your body, even in brain cells, 
are now different from what they were, replaced with other, similar atoms. 
Did you survive?

3. A man is found to have committed a crime 30 years after the fact, by
incontestable evidence that has finally come to light. Still, and even though
he has not undergone any substantial personality change, the
man claims innocence on grounds that he is, at best, only a replica of his
former self, thus "he" didn't do it. The jury says guilty anyway. Are they
right?

4. The same as 3, except the man lapsed into a 30-year coma shortly after
the crime, then awakened as in 2. Is he guilty?

5. The same as 3, except the man was cryonically suspended after the crime, and
then was replaced with an atomically perfect replica as in 1. The replica is
then
revived. Is that person guilty?

6. Starting with a head-only cryonics patient, we rebuild the body using
nanotechnology, DNA information, etc. and reintegrate head and 
body, before reviving the person. Our patient says he feels fine, just like
his old
self in every way, and tests show that he has no deficits, problems
with motor control, etc. Did the original person survive? 

To me the answer to all 6 questions is "yes."

>Finally, to recapitulate yet once again: I assert that EVERY proposal on
>criteria of survival (that I have seen) can be put in doubt by various
>thought experiments. We also KNOW that many possibly relevant questions
>stem from our lack of knowledge of the laws of nature, including the
>fundamentals of space and time, and of our own brain anatomy and
>physiology. It is therefore premature to pretend to know the answers, or
>even--in my opinion--to form even moderately firm conclusions.  
>

To my way of thinking, many possible doubts can be resolved by the
notion of "pattern survival" in which the person can survive in a *different*
though similar or equivalent physical system. This in turn seems reasonable
because (again in my view) information and its processing are what are
important to personhood, not the physical platform that supports this. I
think this
applies even when the "processing" is not mere calculation but whatever
goes on when we feel pleasure, pain, or other emotions. I don't think
this point of view is just "arbitrary"--with competing points of view on an
equal
footing, though it would be a lengthy matter to go into all the reasons why. 

But also, in my view, there are some questions that, to a degree, can *never, in
principle,* be settled by factual knowledge alone, however detailed (unless
perhaps
you include knowledge of what sort of opinions it takes to make an
individual happy). 
Questions of identity and survival are in this category. Do we die each time
we lose

consciousness, to be replaced by a different individual who happens to have our
memories and may *think* he/she is the same but really is not? And so on. 
The reason these questions can't be finally settled by the usual sort of
factual knowledge is that there is more than one explanation that fits 
the facts. That doesn't mean there is no prefered answer, however. The best
answers 
have certain, other desirable features in addition to just "fitting the facts."

>But of course it is not premature to make choices and place your bets--as
>we are compelled to do in any case, since even the default choice of doing
>nothing also has its consequences.  
>
No argument there, good point.

George Smith, #11156, asks for opinion re chelation therapy. As I understand it

(though my knowledge is limited) it is supposed to erode atherosclerotic plaques
in blood vessels by "freeing" the calcium so it can be eliminated from the 
body. But I haven't heard much on how well it works--I'd like to know more
myself.


Thomas Nord, #11158:
>I started of course investigating around present facilitys, remembered Alcor
>moved out of California partly due to the shakes, getting it hotter instead
>now in Scottsdale as also have a major airpollutionproblem.


Over and over you refer to Scottsdale as having "a major air pollution problem."
I have lived in this locale for nearly 5 years now (in an industrial area to
be sure,
but not far from residential areas). For awhile there was some sort of
burning going on
from time to time nearby, but I haven't noticed it for some time. Otherwise
there

does not seem to be any particular pollution in the air. Most days are clear and
sunny, with a few wispy clouds. Some other days it rains. Maybe you have
statistics
on the quantity of pollutants, and maybe these show that Tucson and some
other cities are better than here. Possibly there was a problem, but it is
now cleared
up.  I don't think, in any case, that Scottsdale is (now) any
worse than Riverside, CA was when we (Alcor) used to be there. Scottsdale 
does not have any heavy industry that I know of (unless you count sports and 
tourism). Air pollution such as it exists probably comes from auto exhaust.
But I find 
it hard to believe that we have a "major air pollution problem." Nobody I
know of 
around here complains of that, not people I know or in the newspapers or
elsewhere.

Mike Perry

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