X-Message-Number: 11828 Date: Wed, 26 May 1999 19:02:00 -0400 From: Daniel Crevier <> Subject: zombies, ducks and consciousness. I was surprized at the vehemence with wich Mr. Ettinger replied to my arguments in message #11800. He states for example that: >Mr. Crevier (among others) takes an arbitrary stance and fails to >label his postulates as such. And later: >At least, Dr. Perry understands my arguments, and >agrees that his isomorphism postulate is only that, and does not claim >certainty but only expresses leanings, as do I. I had said: >There cannot be one kind of mechanisms (the A's) that make physical >systems just behave as if they were conscious, and another kind (the >B's) that make them really conscious. All right, maybe I should have qualified this and said something like: "The argument I am examining states the there cannot be one kind of mechanisms...". This is what you do in scientific papers, and I had hoped to be allowed to dispense with it in the informal context of Cryonet. On the other hand Mr. Ettinger replied: >Yes there can. The computer predicts or describes behavior, and a book >written by a computer could do the same, and a robot controlled by the >computer or the book would behave as if conscious. I don't see any maybies there either, and that position sure looks like a lot more than a mere "leaning". Mr. Ettinger counters me with propositions, the first of which states: >1. We do not yet understand the physical basis of consciousness. and continues: >Prop (1) by itself ought to be enough to warn against any assumption >that any inorganic system, let alone a computer, coud be conscious. I don't follow: if you don't know what causes X, how can you be prejudiced in one way or the other? In particular, if you see a being that displays all the appearances of having X, would'nt it be logical, in the absence of reasons to the contrary, to grant that this being has X? In other words, if appearances are against you, the onus of the proof is on you. Part of the misunderstanding may reside in a misapprehension of how strong the appearances can be, and in a belief that one can easily fake X with smoke and mirrors. Indeed Mr. Ettinger states about his second proposition that >we already know ... that a computer could fool at least >some of the people some of the time, and programs with that >capability already exist. Well, I don't know of anyone who's been fooled yet in a controlled experiment. Remember: we are talking about a being whose behavior is *absolutely indistinguisable* from what it would be if it were equipped with X. To use the duck analogy, which Mr. Ettinger is fond of, suppose you are presented with a "duck" that not only looks and quacks like a duck, but also swims and flies like a duck. It eats and excretes like one, mates and lays eggs, which even- tually turn into small "ducks" that grow into full-fledged "ducks". It would take *very* solid grounds for the contrary to claim that this "duck" is not a duck. A "conscious" computer would present us with a very similar situation. It could see, hear and talk, and control a robot body. It could hold a conversation with you and express heartfelt opinions. It might even feel upset if you contradicted it too much, as happens in human discussion groups ;). You could become friends with it. It could be part of a work team involving several people, and enter into the usual office politics. Everyone in the team would testify to its apparent consciousness. Discussing with it could prompt it to emit original ideas, that might eventually grow into full fledged world views or theories. Mr. Ettinger admits that such a computer could exist. I think it will, in twenty to thirty years, at which time the discussion we are having will become much more than academic. If you don't know what causes consciousness, you don't have any grounds for denying that this computer is conscious. The arbitrary stance (be- cause, I'll venture to say, that is what it is) that it takes an additional or a different mechanism to cause consciousness is not justified. In fact, even stating that there is a "physical basis for consciousness" (other than the physical processes required to make one behave as if conscious) is an enormous unlabeled postulate in itself. This is so because (and here I'll repeat myself because this seems to be the only way to get the point across) if such an additional mechanism were required, then it would be possible to make systems that act *exactly* as if conscious but are not conscious. Thus, adding the additional mechanism would, by definition, have no observable effect whatsoever. Believing that something that can have no effect must exist is an act of pure faith. There are other points in Mr. Ettinger's reply with which I disagree, but this posting is getting too long and I'll reply to them some other time. I would like to add a word about isomorphism, though. Mr. Ettinger seems to think that, contrary to Mike Perry, who understands the word maybe :), I have an incontro- vertible belief that it is a sufficient condition for consciousness. In truth I hold no such belief. I don't think either that it is a logical implication of my position. For example an inert book merely describing a mind could not be conscious, because no such book could ever behave as if conscious. I'm sorry if anything I said previously was offensive to Mr.Ettinger. He is a witty and worthwhile advocate, and I enjoy our discussions. I hope we'll continue to have them in good humor. Daniel Crevier, Ph.D. Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=11828