X-Message-Number: 14162 Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2000 11:36:09 -0700 (PDT) From: Scott Badger <> Subject: Re: Identity [Cynthia and Kevin Spoering] Cool idea, Kevin. Bob Ettinger makes a good point that computers may never be a suitable substrate for human consciousness, but even if we assume for the moment that a shared consciousness is possible, your argument for saving the original "you" still seems unnecessary. If your biological body is accidentally destroyed, then until a new body is created for you, you're identity is wholly within the machine. What substantial difference would there be between that temporary state and being uploaded into a machine without the high bandwidth connection to a bio-body? Consider what would happen if suddenly the connections between all the nodes were severed? Now instead of a shared consciousness, you have several "you's" existing simultaneously. What's the difference between them except for geography and type of container? Wanting to keep the bio-body reminds me of an old conversation with my mom: "Why aren't you wearing that new jacket I bought you?" "I like my old jacket." "What's wrong with your new jacket?" "Nothing. This one is just more comfortable. It's been a good jacket." "But it looks terrible." "Hey! It's got personality!" Don't get me wrong. I like my bio-body, too, and I like the option you describe. I'm just having a hard time logically justifying why I see that as being preferable. I know what you mean about not being able to shake the feeling that an upload would "just" be a copy. Especially when you consider the possibility of a non-destructive scan which results in an uploaded self while leaving the original alive and intact! It would seem intuitively clear at that point that the upload is a copy and is not really you, right? But that intuition is mainly derived, I believe, from our observation that the alleged original occurred in time prior to the alleged copy and that the copy is in a different style container (i.e. a computer). However, if I make an exact copy of you when you're asleep and the duplicate is physically identical to you, then how will either of you determine which was which when I wake you both up? Ok, I agree that I would know which of you two was the original but the point is that there would be no substantial or functional difference. You'd both be anxious to figure out which one was the real you, but you'd both be the real you. Of course, there are important advantages to having a shared consciousness network mainly, being able to survive the destruction of any one node. But also being able to work on multiple projects at the same time, observe multiple events at the same time, etc. You may prefer one container over another but does that impact the integrity of your self if the exact same information resides in each? It's like deciding which mug you choose to pour your coffee into. You can pour the liquid from one vessel into another and back again but the coffee will taste the same. (OK, OK, maybe it's not a great analogy) I guess I'm saying that I share your intuitions and I've been trying to build an argument to deconstruct what I suspect is a misconception fueled by that intuition ... namely that there is a substantial difference between exact iterations of the self that an exact copy is still somehow less desirable than the original. I would also suggest that a sense of continuity may be a necessary but insufficient factor in preserving the self. It may also be the case that a functional relationship with the environment is needed to maintain the integrity of the self. Who "I" am is more than my memories, beliefs, dispositions, etc. "I" am also defined by my relationship to the environment. Being reanimated and awaking to a very different future environment may create significant challenges to the integrity of my "self". Developing a functional relationship with that environment as soon as possible will help minimize the distress. Hopefully, there will be skilled individuals assisting in our reintegration. Please note that I'm only speculating here and I certainly don't claim to have the most correct argument. It should also be clear to all that I have waaaay too much time on my hands. Vita perpetuem, Scott __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Get Yahoo! Mail Free email you can access from anywhere! http://mail.yahoo.com/ Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=14162