X-Message-Number: 14676
Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2000 13:05:24 +0200
From: Henri Kluytmans <>
Subject: Re: sentience in other media (copies and feeling)

Ettinger wrote:

>We cannot assume the mind depends only on the neural network, 
>which in any case is much too vague. 

However, my impression was that most neuro-scientists do assume so...
Is this not correct ?

>However, on a more fundamental level it is true that, 
>if you could copy the position of every atom, you could 
>copy the person, without knowing how the parts work together. 

OK, I agree.

>But that bypasses the two significant questions.
>First, as Dave Pizer and many others have said, the 
>"philosophical" problems have not been solved, and 

Those philosophical problems are a seperate issue. 
However, as I stated in my other post to this list, 
when using the informational definition of identity 
there do not seem to be any such problems.

>it is not clear--and probably not true--that a copy 
>"ought" to be considered to share your identity. 

The copy and original do not share *one* identity, they 
have two identical but seperate identities. At least at 
the start they are identical, after that they will diverge.

>Second, it is not clear, and probably not true, that 
>sentience (feeling) is strictly a function of "information" 
>or data processing, in the sense that only isomorphism matters 
>and any "rendering" of you is you. 

I see feelings, instincts and emotions as small agents 
in the human mind. (Like in Marvin Minsky's model of the 
mind.) This is scientifically the most workable model. 
And therefore most neuro-scientists seem to use it.

>A description of a thing IS the thing ONLY in some cases or 
>for some purposes; in general, the map is NOT the territory. 

In case of the mind, a description is not the same as the thing. 
Because in this case the thing is a continuously changing process. 
Our mind (at least, when we are not frozen) is a dynamic information 
process, not just static information.

However when in a frozen state, our mind is just information 
and thus it would then be sufficient to have a description of 
the thing only. (I suppose you agree...)

According to your own statement above, a description of 
the position and orientation of every atom and/or molecule 
in a frozen brain should be equal to keeping the frozen 
brain itself. (Because according to physics identical 
particles in the same state are interchangeable.)
Of course, such a description (of all atoms/molecules) 
would contain a awfull lot of redundancy.


>In particular, if feeling requires (is constituted by) 
>electrical/chemical standing waves of some sort 

I still dont understand how those "standing waves of some 
sort" are constituting feelings.  Could you please elaborate?


>-- SIMULTANEOUS coordinated changes --
>then not all substrates could produce them, and a Turing tape 
>never could, which means that no computer ever could.

In principle a discrete information processing system like 
a Turing Machine can approach the behavior of any analog 
system as close as wanted. (Although not being more 
energy efficient.) It cannot duplicate the behavior of 
any analog exactly. But when it can duplicate a system with 
greater accuracy (resolution) than the noise level it will 
be sufficient. Anyway the not to close *future* (for example a 
couple of weeks later) behavior of a human mind is shaped 
largely by the input it receives from the external world 
in the mean time, and not by it's internal processes alone.

Grtz,
>Hkl

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