X-Message-Number: 14733
Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2000 20:21:07 -0700
From: Lee Corbin <>
Subject: Re: what is it? (personal identity)

In Message #14723, David Pizer wrote

>If what Lee said is true:
>>........... memory, though vastly important and central,
>>isn't sufficient:  your personality also depends on other
>>things---two probably being your attitudes and core beliefs.
>
>Then:
>
>Question One:	What is the exact difference between memory
>in your brain and attitudes and core beliefs, if there is any?

I don't know, but here are the reasons that I conclude that
*memory*, is different from  *attitudes and core beliefs*.
(The reasons are very much like reasons that you have put
forward, if I'm not mistaken.)

1.  My attitudes and core beliefs appear to be able to change
independently (or almost so) of memory.  For example, I can
merely do a lot of thinking and find that a core belief has
changed (though this is rare) yet the thinking did not change
my long term memory.  Also, drugs appear to strongly influence
attitude, but with no significant effect on my memories of who
and what I am.  So therefore, they're not the same thing.

2.  I believe that a sufficiently advanced technology could 
tinker with a rather large number of my long term memories---
e.g., what happened in high school---and I wouldn't even realize
that it was happening.  (To be sure, the more of such tinkering,
the less that I'd be me, but the point is that all along my
attitudes and core beliefs would not necessarily be changing; so 
therefore they're not the same thing.)

>Question Two:  Assuming Lee has the memory "It was hot yesterday,
>when I was playing chess"  and Dave has the exact memory at the
>same exact time, "It was hot yesterday, when I was playing chess"
>- Does having the same exact memory at the same exact time make
>it the case that in that instant Dave and Lee are the same person
>(that sounds to me like what Lee is saying);

I wouldn't say that this would make us the same person.  The reason
is that there would be so many other memories that aren't the same.
(I do admit to not having an entirely clear understanding of your
(very difficult) question, because, for one thing, how can those
memories have any effect if I'm not recalling them?  They perhaps
do; but this is extremely thorny.)  Moreover, our basic dispositions
might be rather different; you might have many feelings different
from mine in terms of confidence, pessimism, energy, contentment,
etc. 

>or does the fact that Dave and Lee each are feeling the exact
>information in their two different brains show that no matter
>how identical the memories were that they shared, Lee and Dave
>would still (and always) be two separate, different persons,
>even under any possible conditions of feeling the same memory
>in their different brains?

By "memory" I've been thinking more along the lines of "all
memories".  Suppose that, heaven forbid, your body was suddenly 
vaporized, and at that precise instant my brain became identical
to yours.  I'm sure that you agree that from your perspective,
it would be as if you had suddenly been teleported to northern
California.  You'd say, "What am I doing here in this strange
body?", and, if my chemical system is substantially different,
perhaps you'd start feeling very odd very quickly.

But what about this?  Suppose, again, that your body was destroyed
right now, but that at the same instant my memories (and only my
memories) were replaced by yours.  I still think that "you" would
find yourself here in northern California, but your basic drives
and emotions might be suddenly greatly changed.  Would Dave Pizer
still be?  Perhaps someone like Mike Perry would say yes;
maybe I'd be forced to agree---I don't know.

Lee

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