X-Message-Number: 14941 Date: Fri, 17 Nov 2000 12:29:39 +0100 From: Henri Kluytmans <> Subject: Moving closer to agreement on identities vs persons. I seem to have to repeat myself over and over... <sigh> Dear David, you are still mixing up the terms "person" and "identity" and also the terms "information" and "memory". They are not interchangable!! And I do think that all non-Pizerists agree with this. I already did mention this several times in my earlier postings. A lot of our arguments are about the differences between these terms, please try to prevent making these mistakes over and over again. It is very important in a discussion, to be using the same definitions of terms. I wrote : >>Again, in his last posting David Pizer assumes that some new and >>still unknown physical mechanisms are required to explain how >>the brain can generate consciousness : David replied : >I think almost anyone studying brains would agree that new science is >needed to explain consciousness. But not new physics!! I was referring to new physics. ===== >The difference is that they look at a person as an abstract, >non-physical relation of positions of objects, like neurons, >or molecules or atoms. I do too. >Since no two of these feeling devices can occupy the same space >at the same time, no two physical feeling processes can be the same. But I agree that no two *processes* can be the same. (And I think I do speak for all non-Pizerists.) >I do not see the paradox. What am I missing? OK, in your case there is no paradox, because you're assuming *new physics*. And using the informational approach there is definitely no paradox. But why do they call it the "copy-paradox" then ? >Pizer theory holds that no two separate, physical "feeling processes" can >occupy the same space at the same time. I think all non-Pizerists will agree with this. >Of course, that only shows one of the reasons why the non-Pizerists >are wrong, No, it doesnt, because we agree with the statement. >>Of course two different persons are not the same person. >>Using the "term" person here, only confuses everthing. I >>suggest not to compare "persons" but only *identities*. >We, in cryonics, want to survive as people. We are talking about the >survival of a person, not the survival of identities. My main purpose as a >cryonicist is for, David Pizer, the person to survive, not an identity of With "identity" I mean : the information describing a mind frozen in time. With "person" I mean : the mind when it is in a running state (i.e. an information process according to non-Pizerists). And of course, also we non-Pizerists want to survive as a person too! Because only surviving in a static state is not living. I.e. when cryo-suspended, I dont want to survive as frozen body, I want to be re-animated again. And I'm quite sure Jeffrey Soreff wants this too, although he did say : "but am quite satisfied by survival of my identity." Many non- Pizerists make the same mistake of mixing up the terms identity and person! (And the terms memory and information.) >Your point above is interesting. Perhaps *all* non-Pizerists are not >claiming that two identical persons are one and the same. However, *some* >have claimed this and that claim is what I am doubting. Maybe those persons are only a small minority of the non-Pizerists. >If an idenity was copied and *put* into a second person, who also >felt the identity as did the original person, then we are no longer >talking about 2 idenities, but 2 persons. Again, I think that most non-Pizerists do agree with this statement. >That is where I think the differences arise. That is where I >think there are now two persons, each feeling the same identities, >but each now wanting to survive. We agree again. >I don't know what all the non-Pizerists think about this point. >Perhaps we are not all so far apart. The question should be "What do we consider survival ?". Of course, this is largely a personal opinion based on emotions. I consider the existance of a person with a very large part of my identity (more than 95% of all aspects of my identity, so NOT ONLY my memories) sufficient for my survival. David Pizer seems to have the requirement that his chemical structure must have no discontinuities in time. >To repeat with different words: Two abstract descriptions, neither one >installed in bodies, may be the one same person, but when they are both >installed into 2 separate persons, the 2 persons are not the same because >each person *feels* the memories in 2 different awareness processes, it two >different places in space at the same time. >Or, some have argued that measuring the original, storing the information, >destroying the original and then installing the information in a new person >is a survival of the old person. I have claimed something like this. But I did not formulate it exactly like this. ---------- >What if there was another person in another universise living a life just >like your's and thinking exactly what you are thinking from your day one to >now. What if you were to be destroyed now and you know that other person >in that other universe is not going to be destroyed. Would you still mind >being destroyed? This is contradictionary, if the person in the other universe was living a life just like the other, he would be destroyed too. :) Seriously, I think this is not a good question. But if I would know for sure that a copy of me would survive (a very recent copy) and if I would have total control over my emotions (i.e. being able to turn off my physical survival instinct), then I wouldnt mind being destroyed in this scenario. Grtz, >Hkl Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=14941