X-Message-Number: 17237
Date: Thu, 09 Aug 2001 22:50:40 -0700
From: Mike Perry <>
Subject: Duplicates, Free Will, Atheism, Needs, Desires

#17229: Replies to Aug 5-7 Cryonets [Louis Epstein]
>...
>
>     #17202: Duplicates, Free Will [Mike Perry]
>
>       #17196: Jul 19-22 Cryonet Responses [Louis Epstein]
>
> >...individual identity implicitly requires uniqueness,
>
>Not in my view. It's the bits that count, not the atoms.
>
>"What atoms are these?"
>is not a question answered by their
>arrangement.

For me the arrangement is the important thing rather than which particular 
instantiation it is.

>So if we both buy copies of a book,
>I can take yours since it's the same
>thing as mine?

You can exchange your copy for mine, if you want. But clearly there will be 
a difference between me-with-the-book and me-without, that (by definition) 
would carry over to instantiations of me.


> >>In the case under discussion I think you WOULD be "creating a fantasy
> >>individual" to the extent that a biographer is making an estimate of a
> >>subject.You can't know what's inside someone's head!
>
> >Whatever you put in would actually have occurred somewhere (in one or
> >another parallel universe), thus you would restore this material without
> >having to "know" what it was beforehand.
>
>Every possible combination could occur in some
>parallel universe,so from that standpoint the
>details are meaningless and no effort to approximate
>the frozen person is necessary.

I find some meaning in maintaining ties with the historical setting in 
which I find myself, and that is why I'm arranging to have my remains 
preserved after clinical death. These ties would not survive if my 
structure is obliterated and recreated exactly by guesswork, even though 
the structure itself would reappear. Perhaps this is a too-subtle point for 
many, but it seems very real and important to me. It is discussed at length 
in my book (Ch. 13).

>...>To me, nanites working on my
> >frozen remains would mainly have the task of ascertaining information.
> >With sufficient information "I" could be straightforwardly reanimated (not
> >"just" a copy, but the real, original me, to the level that is important
> >to me), from the information alone, even if the original material is lost.
>
>A sufficiently accurate copy of me made in such a fashion
>would believe very strongly that it was not the "real,original me".

Well (not meaning to disturb you but) this small mental hangup could 
probably be treated easily, under the right circumstances. I think this 
(maintaining the hangup) may be an example of where your desires are 
different from your needs :-)

> >...suppose the choice is as follows. At 75 your brain and mind will
> >be essentially intact and unimpaired. At 110, however, though remarkably
> >enough "you" will still be alive, you will also be a human vegetable,
> >your mind in a dim, twilight state of near-unconsciousness, most of your
> >identity-critical elements now obliterated. Under those assumptions,
> >would you choose a premortem cryopreservation at 75, or wait till nature
> >took its course? (To simplify the argument I'm assuming you have only
> >these alternatives to choose from.) For me, the choice of a premortem
> >suspension would be self-evident.
>
>If the science of 2071 could repair me from
>being frozen/vitrified,surely it would be
>easier for it to repair me from being senescent
>but animated.

How can you be sure? Senescence could well obliterate structure that 
freezing would still leave inferable, despite the fact that one is still 
"alive."

> >Whether it is correct or not, I have the right to this opinion, and feel
> >strongly that I--and others too of course--should also have the right to
> >choose accordingly.
>
>I think that the toleration of people choosing
>accordingly would be a threat to the ability of
>others to choose otherwise.

Why so? Having more options doesn't mean, necessarily, that some options 
will be denied or restricted.

> >>If the hypothesis that we have no free will,since all our actions are
> >>predetermined by the laws of physics applying to our atomic components,
> >>is correct,then we can not logically be held responsible for the
> >>inevitable occurrences.Any concept of our being able to make decisions,
> >>in such a framework,is nonsensical.
>
> >Effectively, we *can* be held responsible, even in the absence of free
> >will, simply by a mutual agreement among others around us ("society") who
> >will enforce such an agreement for their own protection.
>
>Still nonsense,as these actions would be
>as totally predetermined as all others...
>the agreement would not be a consequence of
>the parties,but of particle physics.

So? In practical terms, I don't see it matters much. It's only when you 
insist on a  deeper significance than is warranted that you run into trouble.

>  ...
>
>I am rather baffled by the "clonophobia" recently fanned...
>may it crumble!!

Yes!

>...
>
>     #17214: Atheism [Mike Perry]
>
>[Louis Epstein:]
>
>...My point is that believing in an unexplained
>universe leaves the universe unjustified.If there is
>no underlying answer to the basic WHY? of existence,
>existence is incomplete.

This actually sounds reasonable to me too. But I don't see why the 
"underlying answer" *must* take the form of a sentient being, and in fact 
doubt that this is so.

>Atheism lends itself as least as readily to the
>"natural death" concept as to immortalism.

Atheism comes in more than one variety; some do not "lend themselves" so 
readily.

> >And quite possibly there is an "underlying first cause or principle."
> >But to me this does not equate to a vast, thinking being who responds to
> >prayers and does other things that the traditional God is said to do.
>
>Nor does the Infinitely First Cause have
>to be a particularly "personal" God,certainly
>not one who writes books or plays ethnic
>favorites.

Does this mean that your God might possibly be insentient or not actually a 
conscious, thinking entity as we usually understand it? If so, then maybe 
our disagreement on this isn't so great, only I would not label an 
"infinitely first cause" as "God" to avoid confusion with other concepts 
that don't seem tenable.

>But only its existence can
>give any existence purpose.

To me, the existence of any sentient being is necessary (and I hope 
sufficient) to give that being's existence purpose.

> >So this is why I am an atheist,
>
>Valid reason for being secular,but not for atheism.

Your notion of "atheism" perhaps differs from mine.

> >one, however, "with a concept of divinity," as I explain in my book.
>
>So are you more closely agnostic?

I wouldn't consider myself agnostic because, as a working hypothesis (but 
not an absolute dogma) I assume there is no supreme, conscious entity 
corresponding to traditional ideas of God.

> >A good case for atheism can, I think, be based around the following:
>
> >1. The failure to scientifically verify paranormal effects.
>
>If they were within scientific explanation,
>how would they be paranormal?

I said *verify* not explain. I think paranormal effects could be verified 
(think of levitation or psychokinesis, for instance) without being 
explained scientifically.


> >2. The problem of evil.
>
>Seen how?
>Does the best teacher give his students
>only tests where they know all the answers?

Rabies provides a good example of why I question the existence of an 
all-knowing, all-powerful, omnibenevolent being. (And there are plenty of 
others.)


> >3. Natural (non-theistic) explanations of natural phenomena.
>
>But God is the explanation for why there
>are explanations.

Again, though, this idea of God does not necessarily require that there be 
a supreme, sentient being.

>...
> >4. An ontological argument (a "perfect" being would be changeless, thus
> >arguably insentient).
>
>No more so than an object always in the same
>location never moves(think of a spinning top!)

To me, a case can be made that being (at least somewhat) aware of the 
passage of time and events as they happen is essential for sentience. If we 
are to posit a perfect being who already has experienced (in some sense) 
all things, such an entity could would have no awareness of here and now 
(as distinct from there-and-then), and thus could not be sentient. I'm not 
saying this argument is bullet-proof, but I think it can be defended.

>I often say,"the only things that really matter
>matter because they can never change."

This is an interesting statement. I don't quite buy it whole-cloth, 
because, for instance, my state of mind matters (and that of others), yet 
it changes, but I won't deny the importance of things that can be 
considered permanent.

> >5. The possibility of salvation through science.
>
>Meaning what?

The attainment of a happy, eternal existence.

>...I'm a monarchist,I think authority should flow
>from one person who attains office preferably
>by inheritance.But your needs are more important
>than your desires.Act responsibly,and you won't
>need to be governed.

Once again, the issue of your needs versus your desires. In most cases, at 
the adult level, I think the individual is the best judge of what shall 
apply to that individual.

Mike Perry

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