X-Message-Number: 22277
From: "" <>
Subject: Leibniz vs. Ettinger
Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2003 14:30:30 -0400

Robert Ettinger writes,

>Yes, a brain and its activities in principle could probably be simulated
in a digital computer, or analogized in a different physical medium or
substrate. Whether the product would have subjective life is unknown, but
for the digital computer it seems highly unlikely.

I'd like to disagree with Bob here. I'll invoke the shade of Gottfried
Wilhelm von Leibniz.

Leibniz, who saw the fundamental mechanism of conciousness as that of
representation, responded to Des Cartes's circular "I think therefore I am"
with the deductive "I represent that I represent, therefore I represent".

The advantage of Leibniz's version is that it enables us to distinguish an
empirical hierarchy of levels of consciousness:

A stone is incapable of represention. No matter what events occur, it
expresses no distinct response.

To express distinct responses to external stimuli - at least a plant is
capable of doing that, as for example when an onion sprouts its roots
toward the center of the earth (geotropism) or its leaves toward the source
of light (phototropism). We call this kind of representation "sensation",
and we say the plant "senses light".

A plant cannot represent its own response, however. An onion has no
mechanism for detecting or expressing the root or leaf orientation of
itself or its fellows. To represent responses to sensation is the function
of memory. Such simple creatures as worms, fish, and frogs can be shown to
possess this capability of representation - they possess some
representation of the path to a source of food or sex.

A fish, however, cannot represent its memory. It has no mechanism for
identifying the source of food or sex. To represent a memory is the
function of definition. Some reptiles exhibit this level of representation
- alligators, for instance, can bond to specific partners and reject others.

Reptiles can't represent definitions. They have no mechanism for expressing
their criteria for selecting partners. To represent definitions is the
function of distinction. Many birds - parrots certainly - can associate the
same label with different definitions. They will call many different
containers "a cup", so seem to possess some representation of "cup-ness".
Even pigeons can distinguish between pictures painted by Picasso and
Magritte.

But parrots and pigeons cannot represent their distinctions. They have no
mechanism for comparing or relating distinctions of Picasso and Magritte or
"cupness". To represent distinctions might be the function of metaphor.
Koko the signing gorilla was plainly capable of this, once signing in
emphatic frustration, "Trainers are green shit".

But Koko couldn't represent had no understanding of her insult as an
instance of a metaphor. To represent metaphors is the activity of
methodology, and here we arrive in the sole domain of humans. A human might
say, "Koko was rude" or "Koko's words were naive" - but Koko never could
understand that.

Humans further represent their methodologies; to do this is philosophy. To
represent philosophies is drama. To represent dramas is politics. And to
represent politics is psychology. Or at least that's one way to slice it
up, and of course you're free to slice it otherwise.

Now might we make our conversation more concrete? Is a digital computer
capable of the function of representation. If so, can it represent stimuli?
Can it represent its representation of stimuli? Can it ... well, can it
climb up this hierarchy of representation processes, or where do you feel a
digital computer gets lost? 

>The reason is that "information processing" is NOT necessarily the whole 
story. A simulation is a description, and a description is not necessarily
the thing nor "as good as" the thing. In other words, isomorphism is not
necessarily all that is important. When we understand the physical basis
(anatomy and physiology) of qualia, then we will be in a better position to
guess whether subjective life is attainable in other than organic brains.

If you're willing to take Leibniz seriously, then I'd like to understand
how you distinguish qualia from descriptions - aren't they both mechanisms
of representation?

Peter Merel.



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