X-Message-Number: 22287 Date: Sat, 2 Aug 2003 08:16:58 -0700 Subject: Descartes season! Leibniz season! Descartes season! From: Peter Merel <> Robert Ettinger writes, > Peter Merel offers ideas of "representation" as support for the notion > that > computer simulations can be conscious. > > This is the nub. Leibniz mischaracterized Descartes. It is NOT a > matter of > representation. Representation relates to cognition--important, but not > essential. A quale is not a representation of consciousness or > personhood--it is the > thing itself. I agree that Leibniz mischaracterized Descartes just as the Simmons article suggests. Nevertheless, there is a clear distinction between Leibniz's analysis and Descartes, and I believe that digging at that distinction will shed light here. At least localizing the disinction and agreeing on terms will help me understand you better. So I'll ask some specific questions, and you can tell me "mu" if I'm too far off base for you to answer. I note before continuing that the following draws heavily on the personal philosophy of a brilliant friend of mine, Ken Happel: 1) Your sensors interact with some process in such a way that their behavior changes. Patterns (structures of relationship) among these behaviors represent sensations - for example, your representation of the colors in my shirt - yes/no/mu? 2) A pattern among your sensations across multiple sensors and over time represents an experience - for example, the floral pattern in my shirt - yes/no/mu? 3) A pattern in these experiences represent a definition or "thing" - for example, you saw the back of the shirt, and now you see the front of the shirt, and you represent them as experiences of a single shirt - yes/no/mu? 4) A pattern in these definitions represents a distinction or class - for example, you have seen a lot of shirts like this, and you distinguish them as instances of Hawaiian-shirt - yes/no/mu? 5) A pattern in these distinctions represents a method or metaphor - for example, shirts, cathedrals, umbrellas, and sunscreens are all ways of sheltering from the elements - yes/no/mu? 6) A pattern in these methods represents a methodology - for example Chris Alexander's pattern language of design, or Frank Lloyd Wright's organic architecture - yes/no/mu? 7) A pattern in methodologies represents a paradigm or philosophy - for example, Cartesian or Leibnizian - yes/no/mu? At each step I use the word "represents" to indicate a process of mapping from a classification of observation to a classfication of expectation. This hierarchy of representation need not be lossy - that is to say, just because you classify some sensation as part of a Hawaiian shirt does not entail that you lose awareness of it as a distinct floral pattern, or as part of a fractal, or as red. > Descartes was correct in saying that we KNOW our own existence, > because we > have DIRECT information about our immediate feelings. We can be > mistaken about > the implications of those feelings, or their relation to the outside > world, but > we cannot be mistaken about the feelings themselves. I agree. > What some have called "Descartes' error" can also be called the > homunculus > problem. If the central person is an observer, then must there be > another, > smaller observer (homunculus) inside that one, etc.? > > There is no succession of homunculi. The parts or aspects of the brain > have > many functions, including housekeeping and memory and cognition, as > well as > consciousness. The essence of consciousness is feeling or qualia. A > quale is a > physical phenomenon, not yet characterized. Once more, the quale does > not > "represent" your feeling; it IS your feeling. In a sense, it is the > most basic part > of you. And a description of a quale would not be a quale. I'm not suggesting that a quale represents, but I suspect that a representation of a quale might also be a quale, per above. I am content that a quale is the signal of representation itself. But I am probably misunderstanding you, and I look forward to your responses and corrections. Peter Merel. Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=22287