X-Message-Number: 22290
Date: Sat,  2 Aug 2003 20:40:29 -0700
Subject: Which assumption?  Which consequent? 
References:  <>
From:  (Tim Freeman)

Ettinger is presumably responding to me saying in cryomsg 22272:

>   So we have to decide whether emotions etc. are computational properties.  
>   I think  they are
> 
> Even my own emotions are a computational property.  For all I know,
> the aliens landed while I was sleeping last night, ate all or part of
> my brain, and replaced the part they consumed with some other device
> that simulates the original computation.  If it's a simulation that
> gets the same job done as the original, and I don't get my head
> x-rayed, I'd never know.  By Occam's razor, there's no point in
> distinguishing between two entities if the distinction doesn't make a
> difference, so it makes sense to say that a simulation of an emotion
> is the emotion.  

and Ettinger said:

>Sorry, Tim--same old error, assuming the very thing you're trying to 
>establish.

Instantiate your pronouns, sir.  What am I assuming that I'm also
trying to establish?

>Yet again: A simulation is the same as the original only in some respects, 
>not in all respects. You simply assume, as an article of faith, that the 
>differences are not important. 

No, I'm just refusing to multiply entities without cause.  Show me a
difference that I care about, and I'll make a distinction between a
simulated emotion and a real emotion.

>A decoy might fool a duck, but it isn't a duck. A hologram might fool
>a viewer, but it isn't the original and it isn't "as good" or "the
>same" in all respects. I can write down equations and numbers
>describing a hydrogen atom and its activities, but that description
>isn't a hydrogen atom and can't substitute for it except for limited
>purposes.

Once again, repeating your argument is different from showing
understanding of mine.  In the argument you're responding to, I said
that simulated milk isn't milk, but a simulated calculator is a
calculator.  Since you list a bunch more simulated things that aren't
the things, and you don't reply to my point that the analogy fails
with the calculator, I don't think you read what you're replying to.

>If you really want to face the issue, 

Ad hominem.  You're saying I'm a coward if I don't agree with you.

>don't talk about fancy
>devices--just talk about written descriptions. Do you really believe
>that a written description of you--complete in all details, and
>including a description of your changes over time--would be you, or
>would be a conscious person?

I do things.  Written descriptions don't do things.  Life is about
doing things.  If you eliminate the possibility of doing things by
eliminating the fancy devices, you're eliminating the essence of what
consciousness is.

A written description of a calculator isn't a useful calculator.  A
program that implements a calculator is a useful calculator, *if you
run the program in a suitable environment*.

Similarly, a written description of me isn't me, but if you run the
description in an environment where it can do the same sorts of
interesting things that I normally do, it is me.

The analogy with the calculator is valid.  Please don't ignore it.

-- 
Tim Freeman                                                  
GPG public key fingerprint ECDF 46F8 3B80 BB9E 575D  7180 76DF FE00 34B1 5C78 

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