X-Message-Number: 22295 Date: Sun, 03 Aug 2003 21:47:55 -0700 From: Mike Perry <> Subject: Simulation Again Robert Ettinger writes in part: >Mike Perry writes in part, reminding us of his previous statements: > > >So how can a static > >record have or contain consciousness? My answer is to invoke what I call a > >frame of reference. The static record describes a world--a significant > >portion of a universe--in which events are happening. Among the things > >happening are all the biographical details of the person in question. > >Relative to that world, then, it is reasonable to say that there is indeed > >a conscious person with feeling. But that world is not our world, so we are > >not forced to a conclusion that the described person is conscious as we > >usually understand it. Our frame of reference differs--so a different rule > >applies. > >A valiant effort, but one that seems to me too slippery by far. >"Feeling......relative to (a world of discourse)"? I don't think that has >any semantic >content. One might as well say that Mickey Mouse on screen is conscious, >relative >to the movie. Actually, what I insist on is that the description is *at the quantum level*--in other words, neutrons, protons, photons, etc., thus including atoms, molecules, neurons, brains, and so forth. And (in addition) involving a sizable proportion of a universe like ours. This is the "world of discourse" and it ought to be enough to have some semantic content! (I don't think Disney Studios tries for this level, but leaves a lot to the viewer's imagination!) At the quantum level, of course, events of significance are discrete and a finite description suffices for a finite volume of spacetime--at least that's the assumption I'm making, which applies to persons in our everyday world. >He also says it may be impossible to know for sure whether a simulation is >actually conscious. But I think it is very likely that we can know. For >example, >I suspect the self circuit, or a quale, must involve something like a >standing wave, with spatial and temporal extension. If this is true, then >we know a >digital computer cannot be conscious, because the simulation is nothing but a >succession of sets of numbers representing successive quantum states of the >thing simulated. There is no binding of space or time. Well, let's suppose we find that human brains produce a standing wave when and only when the subject is conscious. So we make a device that only simulates this standing wave; it is not the real thing. But the simulation results, as expected, in behavior that appears in all outward respects to involve consciousness. Perhaps a robot with this device as its brain will shout, "hey, I'm conscious!" and generally behave exactly as you'd expect if it really was conscious. So how do you know it is *not* conscious? Mike Perry Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=22295