X-Message-Number: 22359 Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 15:27:56 -0700 (PDT) From: Scott Badger <> Subject: Space, Qualia and Time ... Oh my! Doug Skrecky wrote: "Agreed, qualia are a rather slippery subject. If one defines brain processes as autonomous from qualia, so that qualia are a mere epiphenomena, then Occam's razor eliminates all qualia. Stated otherwise, if all brain processes occur truely independantly of the existence of qualia, then qualia are entirely epiphenomena. If a brain process is truely independant of the existence of qualia, then it can not veridically report on qualia. If all qualia are entirely epiphenomena, then no brain process can attest to the existence of qualia. Since some brain processes do truefully attest to qualia, then qualia can not be entirely epiphenomena, and some brain processes can not be entirely described by purely material (qualia free) references. Space, time, qualia - go figure." ----------------- I reply: As I mentioned before, I'm not well read on this particular issue and have no business discussing it in public, but I usually don't let a little thing like that stop me. So... Perhaps this is about semantics, but I've been under the impression that consciousness, as we generally think of it, is essentially an accidental side-effect generated when our increasingly complex central nervous systems reached a particular threshold. This emergent quality is what I meant by epiphenomenal. I sort of conceptualize it as the brain s increasingly accurate attempts to simulate the world it lives in. Dawkins suggested that the threshold needed to acquire consciousness was achieved when the simulation became so complete that it included the brain itself. In other words, "I" am just one more object (or representation) in this simulation of the world that my brain maintains. So isn't it possible that the unconscious brain is capable of veridically reporting on this "I" object in the simulation (designed to "represent" the brain) just like it is aware of and can report on the other objects in the simulation? This is tied to the argument in my previous post; that subjective experience may essentially be the brain's reaction to, treatment of, or personal biasing of data. That whole interpretive process is what results in the highly complex and accurate simulation (or representational system) I refer to. Also, Dr. Ettinger has indicated that the only substrate capable of creating qualia is the organic brain. But why wouldn't any sufficiently complex analog to the human brain be capable of resulting in the same emergent phenomena? After all, aren't emergent phenomena relatively common in the world (e.g. ecology is an emergent phenomenon of biology)? I also recall Dr. E trying to explain how a simulation is not the thing itself, and then he used the example of how a text full of information describing something isn t the thing it describes (this from memory so please excuse me if I mischaracterize the argument). But this type of example seems inappropriate because the text isn't 'doing' anything. Like the brain, a proper simulation would be a dynamic process that interacts with and interprets the environment. Dr. E doubts that a simulation can produce consciousness and qualia, yet those constructs may themselves be simulated objects residing in the gray matter. You're right though, Doug. This is very slippery stuff and I have only a layman s understanding at best. Still, I love to hear the views of others on this topic which I do see as central to this groups goals. Best regards, ===== Scott Badger, Ph.D. Member: ALCOR, Extropy Insitute, Life Extension Foundation Assistant Professor/Researcher-University of Idaho Two Original CD's "Phenom" and "Burdens" available at: www.mp3.com/scottbadger __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! SiteBuilder - Free, easy-to-use web site design software http://sitebuilder.yahoo.com Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=22359