X-Message-Number: 2350 From: Ralph Merkle <> Subject: CRYONICS Steve Harris as an Alcor Board Member Date: Fri, 16 Jul 1993 17:27:41 PDT Steve Harris writes: >As regards this last, I am of course glad to see Brian Wowk toss >his hat into the ring as an Alcor Director candidate for 1993. >If it will help this situation, I myself am willing to follow his >example and do the same. I strongly support the election of Steve Harris to the board of Alcor. As many of you know, Steve was a candidate for the board last year, but did not get elected. A likely reason for this is the secrecy involved in the vote, the resulting uncertainty of how others will vote, and the simultaneous need to estimate how others will vote to determine your own optimal voting pattern. This results in voting patterns and instabilities in the voting system that are much worse than the instabilities required by the various theorems on voting that show that no voting scheme can satisfy all of a set of basic requirements. As an example, suppose all members of the board assume that candidate X is wonderful and will certainly win. Then each board member will assume that the other board members will vote for X, hence each board member will decide that the optimal voting strategy is to use their scarce votes to vote for some *other* candidate (because X will surely win, while the more marginal candidate preferred by this particular board member might not). Hence, all board members fail to cast their votes for X, and X loses. This illustrates how a candidate strongly preferred by all board members can lose an election to the board under the current voting system. The simplest method of eliminating this instability (and a broad range of other, related instabilities) is to have all board members reveal their votes to all other board members. Note that a public vote, e.g., revealing votes to all members, is not necessary to eliminate the instability described above. The board members need only discuss and reveal their votes to each other. This will result in a "negotiated" board. The board members would retreat into private session, and would then negotiate over the composition of the new board. Once the negotiations terminated, (all board members figuring they have accomplished as much as they can accomplish using their votes), then the new board is announced. It is theoretically possible that this method of voting will not terminate, e.g., that two board member's voting behavior both depend on the other board members in an unstable fashion. This problem is indeed inherent in any voting scheme (unlike the more severe instability described above, in which the board fails to elect a candidate who all board members desire to have on the board). A simple method of resolving this problem which is as satisfactory as any other would be to (1) have the board members adopt an unbiased order of themselves (alphabetical by last name is fine); and then (2) have the board members each cast a single vote in the specified order, and then (3) repeat step (2) until either all votes have been cast, or all board members have elected not to cast their remaining votes. I *very* strongly urge the board to eliminate secrecy among themselves during the voting process. Such secrecy can lead directly to bizarre voting patterns, voting patterns that *no one* desires. Whether or not the board would also wish to make the vote public is a second issue, which the board might or might not wish to do as it sees fit. Ralph C. Merkle Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=2350