X-Message-Number: 25182
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2004 07:12:34 -0800 (PST)
From: Scott Badger <>
Subject: Re: Libet

If I understand correctly, Dr. Ettinger questions the
veracity of Libet's hypothesis. I would say that a
distinction needs to be made here between interpreting
Libet's results as (1) indicating that unconscious
volitions precede conscious volitions, and (2)
indicating that voluntary acts are preceded by
neuronal activity Libet referred to as readiness
potentials (RPs), and that the conscious intention to
act occurs after the preparations to act have already
been put in motion. 

For one thing, the first interpretation assumes a
great similarity between unconscious mental events and
conscious ones. This may or may not be the case, but
clearly unconsious volitions of some type do exist and
influences our behavior to some degree.

To a materialist, the second interpretation seems to
follow quite naturally. As Blackmore points out, it's
magical thinking to believe that the conscious mind
precedes such neural activity. The mind is what the
brain does, after all, not the other way around. It 
makes sense that consciousness would not occur
simultaneously with these neural preparations to act.
Can we describe these neuronal initiations as
unconscious volitions? Perhaps Donald can offer some
insight here.

Some are disturbed by this attack on our sense of free
agency, but few people would really argue that all
volition is conscious. We all do things that we later
describe as 'unintended". We like to hold to our
commonsense feeling of free agency, but the degree of
freedom we actually possess is, at best, quite
limited. We generally think of free agency as
'uncaused' conscious volition. So behavior caused by
UNconscious volition would not qualify. But, of
course, both unconscious and conscious volitions have
antecedants and thus are 'caused' in one way or
another (e.g. genetic predispositions, how you were
conditioned by your environment, etc.)

It doesn't make sense to me for us to try to increase
my sense of free agency by striving for 'uncaused'
volition, but we can strive for greater awareness of
and thus greater control over behavioral antecedants.

Scott Badger

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