X-Message-Number: 25228 Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2004 20:14:18 -0800 (PST) From: Scott Badger <> Subject: Identity Richard (and those still following the thread): Consider two scenarios: (Case #1) Suppose I could see beyond 3 dimensions and into time. So when you walk across a room, you appear to me as a worm, one end starting at the time when you entered the room and the other end when you left the room. I would see not only the you that entered the room, but every instantiation of you every microsecond as you passed through the room. From my 4th dimensional perspective, there would be millions of versions of you in the room simultaneously. Each one would appear to be an almost exact duplicate of the instantiation that preceded it in time. Still there would be very minor changes in terms of location and the arrangement of your molecules, etc. So which one is the original and which the copy? Ridiculous question, of course! They are all you . If you had to choose one to survive, which one would you select? The one that exited the room? OK. But would you settle for the one that entered the room? Would you consider that to still be you? What about 5 minutes ago? What about 3 days ago? Where is the line and how can you justify the existence of a line? You insist that you and a duplicate in the same room at the same time would be two different people. But how is that scenario really different from the you now and the you just before now? Just because you can t see in 4 dimensions as you can see in 3 dimensions doesn t mean a real difference exists between the cases I describe. (Case #2) A surgeon cuts the corpus callosum of a patient, separating the two hemispheres of the brain. What happens to your hypothetical QE? Is it still intact? Clearly it is from the reports of those who ve undergone such surgical procedures. What is happening here? Are there two QE s created? Let s take it further. What if (and I believe Mike Perry already addressed this but I missed your response if there was one) a cryonically frozen brain is devoid of damage except it has been split into 3 parts instead of 2 and then put back together? You insist that disassembly destroys the original QE, so is it destroyed at this level of disassembly? Remember, the QE apparently wasn t destroyed when the brain was cut in half. What if we split the brain into 10 pieces and successfully reassemble it? What about 100 pieces or 1 billion? Where is the line and how can you justify the existence of a line? To me, despite your assertion that super intelligent computers in the future will most likely agree with you (such hubris), your arguments are still unconvincing. Nothing personal, of course, but your hypotheses, despite their traditional foundations, are no less speculative than Perry s, Donaldson s or mine. You seem to think that we are seeking comfort in non-traditional definitions of identity, but is it possible that you are seeking comfort in traditional definitions of identity? Adopting your traditional view makes everything very black and white, and my years tell me that topics of this magnitude are rarely resolved with plainly obvious and simple black and white solutions. I do agree that you should provide your cryonics firm with an advance directive stating your preference with respect to uploading vs. biological re-animation. The only policy cryonics firms need to have in place is that they will honor such advance directives to whatever degree is feasible and reasonable. Best regards, Scott Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=25228