X-Message-Number: 25290 Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2004 08:46:59 -0800 Subject: Responses to Mike Perry From: <> Dear Mike: Welcome back! I have divided this message into four sections for easier reading, based on your original message headers. QE SURVIVAL You wrote: [snip] "I've said before that this seems arbitrary. I see no reason why it should be self-evident that a gradual replacement of atoms in the QE *must* result in continuation of the subjective life of the *original* person, if we allow that sometimes copying the QE would not permit this." Why is this mug of coffee on my desk the same mug of coffee it was 10 minutes ago, and not a different one? Precisely because the physical system I refer to when I say 'mug of coffee' has had the properties associated with being a mug of coffee for every instant in those 10 minutes. Now suppose there were some moment T in these past 10 minutes when the physical system did NOT have all those properties; suppose, for example, that it were split in half vertically. Then we must say the mug of coffee was destroyed, and stopped existing, by which we mean the physical system we referred to as a 'mug of coffee' stopped having all of the properties of a 'mug of coffee'. Subsequent rejoinder of the two halves of the former mug of coffee results in the creation of a new mug of coffee, precisely because the physical system came to acquire the coffee-mug properties, when it did not have them. All this is a consequence of the fact that when we speak of the survival of something, be it a mug of coffee or a qualia experiencer, we are not referring to the preservation through time of every property of the physical system, which would imply complete immutability, and is strictly forbidden in this universe of ours. Most properties of a physical system are irrelevant to the *function* of the system we are interested in. Take a light bulb. There are an uncountable number of properties associated with a light bulb, including the exact quantum states of every single atom. However, these properties can vary widely and the light bulb is still capable of producing light. Since its capacity for producing light is the only function of interest to us, when we say a given light bulb is the same light bulb it was 10 minutes ago, we mean merely the physical system had the properties of being a light bulb for all 10 minutes. In a similar fashion, a physical system must have a set of properties Q in order to be able to experience qualia. If you change it in such a way that the physical system no longer has every property in Q, then it is not capable of experiencing qualia. If you then change the system again so that it DOES have every property in Q, then you have created a new qualia experiencer, BY DEFINITION, since one did not exist (in that physical system) prior to your change. This is not arbitrary, it is a very consequence of reality and the language we use to describe it. You wrote: "One can postulate, for instance, that the *original* subjective life *cannot continue* if the atoms are replaced--different atoms, different system, original dead, as I've said before." We are not talking about the survival of a particular physical system, but of a set of properties of a physical system. The properties may survive, even while the system changes, as long as the system changes in ways consistent with those properties. [snip] INFORMATION AND MEANING You wrote: "Richard has said, in reference to records or chunks of information, that 'these arrangements do not possess an objective interpretation, as the word "record" might suggest,' and more generally has denied that information can have intrinsic meaning. I have challenged this, with my example of a movie encoded in a format that should be guessable by intelligent aliens, and I stand by my challenge, even though he has brushed aside this argument as 'hand-waving.'" You are trying to make the following argument: 1. I can create a movie encoded in a format guessable by intelligent aliens; 2. Therefore, information has an objective existence. Do you see that (1), even if true, does not imply (2)? Additional premises are needed, which you will be unable to prove even if you supply. The claim of (1) is itself meaningless, since it amounts to saying, 'I can construct a movie that a machine almost exactly like me (i.e. possessing my property of "intelligence") can decode.' Even if this is true, it isn't helpful. It most certainly does not demonstrate that information has an objective existence. As I have said before, it is quite possible that by typing on my keyboard, in an attempt to produce a program that simulates some sports game in an alternate universe with strange laws, I would end up with exactly the same sequence of bits encoded by a brain program. Which interpretation is valid? The answer is: neither. The interpretation of the bits is completely subjective and arbitrary--- the bits aren't anything, except bits. Actually, the fact that we see them as 'bits' is itself subjective. The only thing objective is the existence of the actual atoms we are using to store the bits. This is the materialistic viewpoint. People who believe in the existence of objective information and patterns cannot be considered materialists, but rather, must be considered spiritualists. [snip] MULTIPLE QE'S PROBLEM [snip] You wrote: "Let's suppose we separate a cryopreserved brain into just two pieces, each of which could function as a QE." It is not possible for there to be two of me. Therefore, there are two possible outcomes from the result of this division: (1) I am in one piece and not the other; or (2) I am in no piece, because I did not survive the division. You wrote: "Next, for the reanimation procedure, we assume repairs are done on each piece separately. These repairs, it turns out, further separate the brain matter into tiny pieces which cannot function as QEs. According to Richard's theory, this should be no problem so long as the two parts are repaired sequentially, since a QE is present at all times." No, this assumes there can be two of me. This is not possible, and therefore your thought experiment does not apply to my view. [snip] WHY CHOOSE CRYONICS [snip] Why do you experience in your body, and not the body of another? Surely you would agree that according to the multiverse interpretation, an exact copy of you just suddenly came into existence on the moon, and will quickly die a horrible death. Why wasn't that you? Why are you tied to your body instead of all these alternate fates? Your view cannot explain such things. I still do not understand why you advocate cryonics. It seems like you are saying, 'Well, I am 100% sure I will be resurrected, just not that the resurrection will be "painless".' Of course, it would be painless and painful for different copies of you. I do not understand why you believe in the existence of a mechanism that would transport you to one of these copies and not the others (see preceding paragraph). Best Regards, Richared B. R. 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