X-Message-Number: 25337 Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 17:02:47 -0800 Subject: Re: QE problems, to Robert From: <> Dear Robert: You wrote: "I have postulated that the experiencer and the experience are the same--perhaps some kind of modulated standing wave in the brain, with extension in space and time, so there is physical overlap or continuity between predecessors and successors, tending to lend validity to at least partial identification of earlier and later selves. (This is admittedly pretty vague, but perhaps not empty.)" Well, consider this: a standing wave is something that happens to a system, not something that exists. But 'experiencer' is a noun and therefore should be taken to represent something that exists, while 'experience' is an action and therefore should be taken to represent something that happens. This is why I think it is best to associate the system with the experiencer, and the experience with the change of that system---it leads to more consistent and better use of the English language, as well as clarity regarding survival criteria. You wrote: "RBR says the 'qualia experiencer' (QE) is material in the brain, and the qualia themselves are what happen to the QE, or sequences of changes in the QE. I think this is not just a difference of language, and that RBR's formulation is questionable, as follows." Well, I do not think they are precisely equivalent. I think, your criteria is implied by mine, but not conversely. But, I think they are quite close, and therefore lead to similar conclusions. You wrote: "By analogy, one might liken the QE to a car, and a quale to the motion of a car, the car and its motion together being a traveling car, the QE and the quale together the experiencer having the experience. Without the motion, the car is only a potential traveler, and without the car there is nothing that can travel. Sounds all right so far." Yes, this is an easy-to-understand parallel, with one fault I will note below. [snip] You wrote: "By RBR's reckoning, as I read him, if there is an interruption in the integrity of the QE--even minor damage, if it is sufficient to cause loss of ability to function--then that counts as destruction of the QE and permanent death of the person, future repair counting as construction of a new person and not survival or resurrection of the old. " Yes, but I would not say this is 'minor damage'. The brain can sustain tremendous injury, with bullets ripping through the skull, vast sections removed, damage from lack of oxygen, great damage from Alzheimer's and human equivalents of Mad Cow, and yet, the person can still experience (even with no memories, in the case of advanced Alzheimer's). The brain is not like a car, which has no redundancy in most components, such that the failure of one destroys the car. I imagine that even a highly damage brain would be capable of some base experience, even if that experience would not be on the level with what we experience when we are in top shape. You wrote: "I emphasize again that we just don't know enough yet about biology, matter, space, or time to draw any definitive conclusions; but I think my formulation is less vulnerable. So I am a tentative advocate of the quantitative view including overlap or physical continuity, with no distinction between the experiencer and the experience. You can even have 'survival' after 'death' by (say) having a brief and minor interruption of functionality, with at least some degree of overlap between the pre-damage and post- repair states. " Consider what a brain would look like that can no longer experience. You say even frozen brains have exhibited some neuronal activity post-thawing. Does this correlate with some primitive, altered experience? Possible, we would need to know more about the correlates before saying for sure. But I think if you contemplate the possibilities, you may find your 'sufficient overlap' criteria is the same as my definition, or at least very close. Best Regards, Richard B. R. Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=25337