X-Message-Number: 25375 Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 22:54:39 -0700 From: Mike Perry <> Subject: QE survival, information, reality References: <> Richard, you wrote, "We are not talking about the survival of a particular physical system, but of a set of properties of a physical system. The properties may survive, even while the system changes, as long as the system changes in ways consistent with those properties." To which I responded: "It strikes me that *may* is the operative word here. Yes, I agree 'the properties *may* survive' (emphasis added). The main point I was trying to make is that it is not self-evident they *do* survive," To which you responded, On the contrary, my claim is that it *is* self-evident. The properties in question here are those of a qualia experiencer, which is defined as a thing capable of experiencing qualia. It seems reasonably self-evident that *a* qualia experiencer survives, one that is at least a (reasonably accurate) replica of the original. That much I won t dispute. However, being a replica alone is not good enough, in general, from your perspective, as you have said repeatedly. Here you do end up with a replica, a *different* QE, so clearly the original has perished, even though *a* QE was present at all times. The QE could be (reasonably, I think) said to have *started* as the original, but then became progressively hybridized, until it no longer was the original. At least this kind of argument would probably seem reasonable to an antique fancier, who might be interested in a true original of something, rather than a replica however made. Can a *different* QE still possess the properties you desire, of continuing *your* existence. Not always, you say, so I ask why ever? Why is it self-evident that in this one case the replica does in fact continue your original existence, though in general it will not? You can say, "because a QE was present at all times"--but so what, it wasn't the *same* QE. You also wrote, I believe in a brain, and this brain has certain properties X, which collectively permit the brain to experience qualia. As long as the brain remains able to experience, it is possible for my subjective inner-life to happen. But when the brain loses this ability, then it is no longer possible for my subjective inner-life to happen. You have said that certain repair scenarios involving a cryopreserved brain would be unacceptable to you even if the end result was a perfectly restored brain similar to the original, using original material in its original locations -if the brain were finely divided into pieces in the interim, for example. This is because during this time the brain would lose the ability to experience qualia. But I maintain that the cryopreserved brain has already lost this ability -how can a cryopreserved brain experience qualia? In its present state it is just an inert lump of matter. A nontrivial procedure is needed to restore it to a functioning state. The same might be said if the brain s material is divided up -a certain procedure (a different one in this case, still a procedure however) is needed to restore the brain to a functioning state, yet (by presumption) such a procedure exists. So I don t see how this scenario differs qualitatively from the first. In either case we are talking, essentially, about a reversible series of steps from a functioning QE, to something that is not a functioning QE, back again to a functioning QE (which additionally is materially similar to the original, with the same atoms in the same places). So where do you draw the line? What types of procedures of this sort would not be acceptable from your point of view and why? I will ask also if a gradual change in atoms is acceptable to you if the subject is unconscious the whole time. You wrote, Constructing a new physical system won't do me any good, since 'I' was the changes that happen to the old physical system, not to the new (or any other) one. I once again bring up the gradual change of atoms, one way of constructing a new physical system which arguably won t do you any good. You also wrote, Numbers, processes, patterns, and such, do not exist (except as concepts in human minds). Trying to prove they exist is rather like proving Santa Claus exists. It can't be done. I think of other things besides collections of atoms as being real and thus existing, such as a book, regarded as a body of information rather than a physical object. If I say, I wrote a book, I am not referring to a physical object, really, even though physical objects were involved, one being the computer hard drive on which the information was initially stored. (If the information had been stored in a volatile form initially, such as sound pulses in the mercury-based delay lines used in early computer memories, the connection with a specific physical object would have been more tenuous -though I won t dispute that even here there is an unavoidable connection with the material world.) I also think patterns (and information more generally) do have an objective existence. The benzene ring is hexagonal, for instance, whether anyone perceives it as such. To me mathematical concepts possess a certain reality that in some ways transcends that of material objects -chairs and tables pass away, the gamma function endures forever. Yes, these are concepts in human minds (and those of other beings which probably exist). I'm not a theist, so I don't think there is one Mind over all, which could serve to legitimize the claim that something exists if it is a concept in or possessed by this one supreme thinking entity. Yet to me reality produces minds which, I think, have enough similarity that certain features will be repeated, such as the ability to reasonably interpret bodies of information, thus granting said information a non-arbitrariness somewhat akin to what would happen if there was one supreme being. You wrote, So this divides people into those who must have proof to accept the existence of something, and those who merely accept the existence of non-physical things without proof. If someone claims to have written a book, they could email me a copy in electronic form, and I would take that as evidence of its existence (as a body of information). Yes, the existence of a body of information implies something about material objects -information, if actualized, must have matter to be written in or on in some fashion, yet to me the information itself possesses a kind of existence all its own. (If someone claims a book exists but cannot produce the requisite information, however, then I start having doubts, just as I do about the existence of Santa Claus.) I also think processes can be informational in nature, and that is how I view persons, as I ve said before. Best wishes, Mike Perry Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=25375