X-Message-Number: 26615 From: "Valera Retyunin" <> References: <> Subject: For Flavonoid Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2005 01:05:17 +0400 > And yes, I do comprehend the idea that > any "originality" attributable to the word processor printed document is > purely conceptual. I also happen to think that any "originality" > attributable to an apple or a human, is also purely conceptual. It depends on what exactly in the human, apple or computer file matters to you. If there was a living and conscious file, whose life (the existence of a particular set of atoms with a particular set of properties) you really wanted to preserve, copying the file obviously wouldn't help. The "original" file's originality would not be purely conceptual. Nor is the originality of you if we define your personal survival as the survival of you who is now reading these words, not just the survival of any of your "prints" who's just thinking they are you and communicates with the world in the same way as you do. Does you belief that the originality of a human is purely conceptual mean that, for instance, you would settle for an exact copy of your child if the "purely conceptual" original was taken away from you? Would the murder of someone dear to you be as inessential as the deletion of a file's copy if you got an exact copy of that person in return? > RBR accuses me of "mangling concepts with things," so I conclude from this > that he thinks that some things most of us think of as "things" such as > your Sunday newspaper, are less real than things such as apples. I don't believe he thinks your Sunday newspaper is less real than yourself. It's just that the newspaper's originality is unimportant, in stark contrast (I assume) to yours. > In speaking of my two identical word processor printed documents, RBR says > "When you printed out two 'copies', you created two arrangements. > They are distinct from each other, but similar. Labeling one as the > 'original' and the other as a 'copy' is disingenous." I agree. I also > fail to see the difference between them and an apple or a human. A tree > can create untold numbers of essentially identical apples. Twin birth, > cloning, etc. can create essentially identical humans. Why not also call > them "arrangements"? Why not. But twins are *widely* viewed as two *different* arrangements, aren't they? Or do you also consider them essentially one and the same person? Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=26615