X-Message-Number: 2699 Subject: CRYONICS: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES From: (Ben Best) Date: Sun, 24 Apr 1994 02:31:00 -0400 I'm a bit surprised that only Robert Ettinger chose to answer Heather Johnson Fac-Royle concerning philosophical questions of cryonics. I'd like to begin with the caveat that I sometimes suspect that "philosophy" deals with problems about which there can be no empirical investigation (by definition). And when confronted with problems about which we can ONLY think, it is often dubious whether a solution can be found (mathematics notwithstanding, insofar as mathematics can produce testable theories). Nonetheless, I'm a lover of philosophy. And concerning "philosophy of mind" I am inspired by the book NEUROPHILOSOPHY by Patricia Churchland. Patricia, in turn, was inspired by the Harvard philosopher W.V.O. Quine, who said that "philosophy of mind" and epistemology can be rooted in empirical science (neurophysiology). I myself am struggling with neurophysiology to get a grasp on the nature of WHAT cryonics must preserve to preserve personal identity. To address Heather's specific questions: (1) PERSONAL IDENTITY The "identity" of mathematics and the "identity" of personhood are little more than a semantic coincidence, I believe. "Selfhood" is what I seek to preserve, in particular MY selfhood, and the selfhood of other cryonicists. And what are the essential properties of selfhood? It may well be that this is an empirical question for which science does not currently have the answer -- but which cannot be solved by "philosophical" means. I am actively following a trail of scientific clues in my series "The Anatomical Basis of Mind" in CANADIAN CRYONICS NEWS. I did mention one "philosophical" question in this connection, however, in a CryoNet posting a couple of months ago. Namely, if an attempt is made to transfer Heather's identity to a computer, how do we verify that her identity was transferred? How do we distinguish between "Heather-in-a-computer" and a "Heather-simulating-machine"? The machine may have all of Heather's memories, but not be Heather. The machine may even answer "I am Heather" as a mistake, rather than a lie. The same problem applies to reconstructed biological forms. If it were possible to identify the anatomical basis of identity, this problem might be solvable. But by what characteristics do we identify the biological structures of identity? (2) METAPHYSICAL STATUS OF CONSCIOUSNESS I believe that consciousness is a "materially governed phenomenon" -- as do most cryonicists. In fact, I believe that mind is produced by the brain in an analogous manner to the production of heartbeats by the heart. Drugs in the brain and lesions to the brain have specific effects on consciousness. I don't think quantum theory has any more to do with the nature of mind than it has to do with any other biological phenomenon. Specifically, I think Penrose is wrong concerning his speculations about consciousness in THE EMPEROR'S NEW MIND. He takes the scientific fact that a dark-adapted frog retina can respond to a single photon and extrapolates to the idea that "somewhere deep in the brain, cells are to be found of single quantum sensitivity". Actually, in producing a conformational change in the rhodopsin protein, photons act more like high energy particles than like objects of "quantum weirdness". I have doubts about the "uncertainty principle" of the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, but I'm quite sure that it has nothing to do with the material basis of consciousness. (3) EXISTENCE OF THE PERSON DURING THE PERIOD OF SUSPENSION You raise "philosophical" questions about the relationship between thought and "being" -- asking if a non-thinking, frozen person can be said to exist. I could also ask if a sleeping person can be said to exist. Or an unconscious person (including a victim of barbiturate poisoning with a flat EEG). A frozen person has the potential of being a thinking, animate person (with the caveat that the freezing process may not work). Assuming that cryonics does work, however, the ethical consequences of destroying a frozen person are no different from those of destroying an unconscious or sleeping person. -- Ben Best (ben.best%) Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=2699