X-Message-Number: 3682 Date: Fri, 13 Jan 1995 18:13:43 -0500 From: "Bruce Zimov" <> Subject: SCI.CRYONICS: Uploading Bob Ettinger is correct in pointing out that: a) It's not just memories, but the "subjective circuit" that needs to be uploaded. and b) We do not know enough at our current state of science to be able to answer these questions conclusively. These are my position as well. Regarding a), Locke in the 18th Century tried to argue that uploading only required transfer of memories. By the way, every potential "uploader" should probably bite the bullet, and go to the library and read Personal Identity ed. John Perry which is a recap of the modern discussion of the problem starting with Locke, and Reasons and Persons by Derek Parfit. Just read Part III of Parfit regarding Personal Identity. These texts remain the most exhaustive analysis of the identity problem in uploading to date. Of course, Locke didn't know about possible uploading technology, but his brilliant analysis of the problem included the transfer of minds from host to host. For a concrete theory for the existence of the "subjective circuit" but by no means the last word, see Edelman The Remembered Present. Edelman is a neurobiologist. The emergent statistical model is another candidate. And, of course, the explain-it-all-away- like-telepresence-we're-zombies model is another more radical alternative. In this last, we would be created anew each day, stored at night, and any continuity would be a psychological illusion. I appreciate very much the reference to Rogue Moon and would like to throw in my own SF reference, if I may, viz. Rudy Rucker's Software. In this novel, the uploaded individual is inside a computer with a bunch of others in this roving truck and tele-linked to walking android terminals. The telepresence makes them think they are really in the android body. Well, at the end of the book, the truck gets attacked and is irreparably damaged. The end is near: "There's heat leaking in from where your friend rammed us. The temperature's up five degrees. One more, and our circuits melt down. Thirty seconds, maybe." "Am I on tape somewhere else?" Cobb asked. "Is there a copy on the Moon?" "I don't know," Mr. Frostee said. "What's the difference?" I always wondered why he said "What's the difference?" The character had to have solved the uploading problem to have that technology. I always imagined that he said "What's the difference?" because whether or not there was a backup was irrelevant, the point was that THAT Cobb's subjective circuit was about to terminate. Notice that the problem really has nothing to do with whether or not the subjective circuit can be transferred as easily as memory. Cobb's problem is that his instance was kaput, and the stored copies were still OK. In other words, at that point, there was NO causal link between Cobb and his copies. Think about that. NO causal link. None. Yes, the information stored may be the same, but there is NO causal link. At least, when you go to sleep and wake up again, your body and brain are a causal link, in fact, there are the ideal storage medium! I don't agree with those that say that behaviour is the only test necessary to identify whether or not a "black box" has an operant subjective circuit. If it were, we might wrongly conclude that tape recorders or films had subjective entities that experienced things everytime the recording was replayed since the behaviour test passed! Locke made the same point about parrots in the 18th century. The only subjective experiences you remember are your wake states, and certain half-awake or dream states, and these are strongly correlated with 30Hz frequencies in the cortex. Until we completely unlock the brain's mechanism in these matters, it is silly to be fooled by clever programming. I stated as much in my response to Coles in AI Expert last year. Bruce Zimov Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=3682