X-Message-Number: 3728 Date: Sun, 22 Jan 1995 21:28:29 -0800 From: John K Clark <> Subject: SCI.CRYONICS Uploading -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "Bruce Zimov" <> Wrote : >Most of your points about interpretation are pretty old. Yes, most good philosophy is. >the Quantum effects are not going to bail you out of the >logical problem of identity. I don't think quantum effects have anything to do with identity and I am sure they can't give individuality to atoms. The first philosopher to examine the principle of "The Identity Of Indiscernibles" was Leibniz 300 years ago. He said that if there is no way to find a difference between two things then they are identical and switching the position of the objects does not change the physical state of the system. Until the 20th century this idea had no observable consequences because nobody could find two things exactly alike. Things changed dramatically when it was discovered that atoms have no scratches on them to tell them apart. The foundation of modern physics is the idea of Exchange Forces ,a direct consequence of The Identity Of Indiscernibles. It has been confirmed experimentally many times in many different ways, for instance, it correctly predicts that all particles will fall into two categories. The wave shape of two identical particles with integer spin ( like the photon) will be an even function , if the spin is non integer ( like the electron) it will be an odd wave function. If you insist on giving individuality to quantum particles that have no internal structure you'd have to throw out most of the work done in physics in the last 70 years, both theoretical and experimental. Trying to develop a theory of consciousness based on position is a bad idea, so bad it's not even wrong. Where does consciousness exist? Where does "red" exist or "fast" or the number "12"? These questions have no answer because they make no sense. >if we are only information then an external interpreter is >required to "read" the processes. Not if Moravec is correct but I'm far from certain he is. I always thought of the physical brain or it's logical equivalent as the interpreter, still, it's an intriguing idea and I look forward to reading his new book. >As for the Turing test, EEG tests can be more indicative of >conscious brain activity than behavior I'm glad I'm living in this day and age, just 40 years ago, before the invention of the EEG I would have no way of knowing if my fellow man was conscious or not. They may have written, acted and talked intelligently or even brilliantly but that's of trivial importance telling me nothing of their internal experience. Today I know other people are conscious, because today I can look at squiggles on a graph. I think the best way for us to understand each others philosophic ideas is to exchange EEG's , that will work much better than language or some other behavior. >I also think that EEG traces should be run on brains in >cryonic suspension Why? We know what the result would be, a flat line. I hope your not suggesting that a brain cooled to liquid nitrogen temperatures is still conscious because that's loony. I haven't read Parfit and if your quote is a good example of his writing I don't intent to start, but maybe he was just having a bad day. This entire debate is whether the subjective experience (not my body or brain) of my Replica is "numerically" Identical to my own or not. Parfit takes it as a given that they are not and then pretends he proved it. All he talks about are objects, subjective experience is not an objet thus I am not an object. I don't care a hoot in hell about objects. - From Parfit REASON AND PERSONS p.201: >I and my Replica are qualitatively identical, or exactly >alike. But, we may not be numerically identical, or one >and the same person. Oh I see, we are "identical" and " exactly alike" but not the "same". Huh? >Similarly, two white billiard balls are not >numerically but may be qualitatively identical. If I give you one and it's impossible to tell even in theory which is which then it's silly to worry that you might have gotten the wrong one. >If I paint one of these balls red, it will not now be >qualitatively identical to itself yesterday. But the red ball >that I see now and the white ball that I painted red >are numerically identical. They are one and the same ball. And if every atom that was in the ball yesterday was replaced by new ones, as happens constantly in our bodies, would it still be the same ball ? >We merely mean that this person's character has >changed. This numerically identical person is now qualitatively >different. MERELY!!! The person's character is the only thing that's important. By "person" I mean subjective experience, Parfit means a few hundred pounds of protoplasm. This quote convinces me that his "numerical" identity idea is a dead end and not a useful concept. John K Clark -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.i iQCzAgUBLyM5hH03wfSpid95AQFzZQTwxfm75ou0wxuKpe389I8F31LV1uJWd7yv cK83+zbOOz9lf+DAsPqyMkOh2Bab6eyf5KpBxV5xQ7HG/skPHUoDxDMBVIO/ox0d 8aZ3WkWqI2z74jvdWKvfYzkWIrBtqdnr6xsJYYt62TAfVGJq+LG1PA0U4WinIMo+ fls6dOdsaiuszB77Kat9P9V/sZsqv6f/I6DDUtMXOTyrBJgfEp0= =XcDL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=3728