X-Message-Number: 3792 From: (Thomas Donaldson) Subject: comments.re.#3781-3786 Date: Fri, 3 Feb 1995 23:50:14 -0800 (PST) Greetings! It seems to me that the discussion of identity would benefit by becoming a bit more focused on its relation to cryonic suspension: to be exact, when and if we are revived, what condition must our brain be in for us to decide that we are the same individual who was frozen so long ago? (Perhaps injured or missing in some things, but still the same person). That seems to me to be the central question. Furthermore, uploading and duplicates will very probably remain impossible until after our revival --- assuming that they are possible at all (cf. Ettinger's comments). When they become possible or close to possible, it will become very relevant to think about identity in that context. 1. Although I believe that there are brain circuits which make us aware of the world around us and give us a sense of unity, I would not call these circuits "self-circuits" because I believe that they are (as brain parts) interchangeable between people, at least those of the same sex (recall minor differences in brain structure between the sexes and possibly with sexual orientation). 2. Our memories always have feelings attached to them. This side of the matter of identity should never be neglected. Naturally the brain circuits which produce these feelings must be duplicated, and tied in with our memories. This suggests that some parts of our circuitry (connections to our amygdala, for instance) also must be preserved because they will differ between individuals. 3. The hypothalamus and the pineal gland play a large role in our hormonal balance and hence in our feelings. They should be preserved well enough to make restoration to their normal state a fairly easy process (ie. it wouldn't be good if we have to go through a kind of "adolescent period" until our feelings came back to those we would recognize as our own). I assume here (I believe with good empirical support, but things can change ... and I might even be wrong to start with) that these parts of our brain basically control other glands not in our brain, such as our adrenals. This ought to mean that if we find ourselves in a body regrown from our own cells, then that body will have the same chemistry and responses of such glands. 4. Memories are crucial mainly because at present they are the only features of our self that we cannot say will definitely survive suspension. Personal memories (which among other things involve our feelings) would rank particularly high in telling us we were the same person. I have spent a large part of my life learning and doing mathematics, and I have feelings about my experiences in mathematics. At the same time, ASSUMING that my ability to learn was retained, I think I would still feel that I was the same person if a lot of the CONTENT I had learned and discovered was forgotten. Yes, I'd have to learn it over again, but that (I assume) would not be hard ... a pain, since one never wants to lose anything, but something doable. On the other hand, feelings are often inseparable from the events causing them. That would mean that if such events were retained, then I would retain a lot (perhaps not all) of the maths I know now. I'm not trying to draw lines here, because I think such lines are arbitrary, but I believe there is a continuum of facts which wouldn't affect my sense of self if I lost them up to others which would. I assume I speak for others, too, if only in a general sense (substitute physics for maths, or whatever). And on a quite different tack: We live in a universe which operates at particular speed for particular parts of it. Even if it were possible to have a computer run a person, it's necessary that the computer run in real time ie. at least as fast as the biological person. Otherwise our uploading will be basically a severely injured version. (And for those who want to put this person into a virtual reality, I don't doubt that could be done, but has all the demerits of less technological solutions, such as taking opium. Sure, for a while you may think you live in a real world, but the REAL world will sooner or later come round to kick you in some delicate place). This puts some strong constraints on the technology required to upload a person. In fact, amid all this discussion of uploading, the specifications of the computer required seem to be consistently neglected. Discussions of uploading into some wonderful computer of some unknown design with unknown features provide us with a modern version of heaven (far off, but "of course" a very nice place to be). In terms of rigorous philosophy or thought, that is ridiculous. It would be good for those who insist on talking about uploading to first specify IN DETAIL just what they aim to be uploaded into. In terms of argument, it's hardly surprizing that the wonderful computer of the future will by DEFINITION be capable of everything needed for uploading, and then some. Long long life, Thomas Donaldson Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=3792