X-Message-Number: 3864 Date: 17 Feb 95 17:29:11 EST From: Saul Kent <> Subject: Options I believe it is fruitful to look at the issue of whether it will become possible to produce duplicates of human beings in the following light. Let's assume that it will become possible either to duplicate us or to produce similar copies of us in the future. If we assume this, it presents us with certain options. For example, if I was alive and healthy and *certain* that a duplicate of me could be produced, I would still argue if confronted with such a duplicate, that it is *not* me. However, if it proves *impossible* to restore me to life by repairing my brain *after* I am frozen, but *is* possible to produce a duplicate of me, or someone similar to me and, if that individual is then *certain* he is me, and if everyone who knew me in the past agrees with him, then the question of whether he *is* or is not me would not be relevant. In such a circumstance, the question of whether I believed (prior to being frozen) that such a person would or would not be me would also be irrelevant. If such a person is *uncertain* he is me and/or if others who knew me in the past are uncertain he is me, it would be a significant issue, but the question of whether I believed prior to being frozen that such a person would or would not be me would still not necessarily be relevant. I am raising these questions because I am working on a document to provide guideliness for those who may be involved in attempts to restore me to life after I have been frozen. In formulating these guidelines, I am assuming that it will be possible to make *many* changes in me, including the possibility of producing a duplicate of me. My approach will be to request that they make every effort to restore me to life (by repairing my brain) to the way I was when I was in good health prior to being frozen *BEFORE* making ANY changes in me. This will enable me to make my own decisions as to which changes I want to see in myself *after* I have been restored to life. If it proves possible to restore me to life in my current state of mind by repairing my brain, and if it also is possible to produce a duplicate of me, I would not consider being *replaced* by such a dupli- cate, although I might want to see one or more duplicates of me pro- duced for other reasons. Saul Kent Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=3864