X-Message-Number: 4066 From: (Brian Wowk) Newsgroups: sci.cryonics Subject: Re: another load Date: 21 Mar 1995 22:21:48 GMT Message-ID: <3knjhs$> References: <3keavs$> <> I really did not want to get drawn into this, but here are my two cents worth anyway. Bob for years has been saying that consciousness may depend on the *medium* that processes information, not just the information processing itself. In other words, although we may one day produce a man with a silicon brain that is behaviorally identical to other men, that man may not be conscious because consciousness (as distinct from mere information processing) somehow requires conventional neurochemistry to exist. If I may be so bold as to present Bob's case further, Bob believes that consciousness can be scientifically investigated. In the decades ahead, we will design increasingly elaborate experiments that will eventually allow us to state definitively what biophysical events are responsible for consciousness. We will then be able to state unambigously what kinds of hardware can be conscious, and what cannot. Bob, have I represented your case correctly? I agree that consciousness (i.e. what people say they are experiencing during specific stimuli) is amenable to scientfic investigation. The problem I have with Bob's thesis is as follows: Imagine that a person incrementally modifies their brain in-situ (the most likely scenario for "uploading" anyway) such that their external behavior remains unchanged. At what point could we objectively say they had ceased to be conscious? Since all experiments on consciousness necessarily involve a paradigm of stimulus and reported response, how could we ever distingish the consciousness levels of two pieces of hardware (or "wetware") that demonstrate the same stimulus-response relationship? ---Brian Wowk Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=4066