X-Message-Number: 4066
From:  (Brian Wowk)
Newsgroups: sci.cryonics
Subject: Re: another load
Date: 21 Mar 1995 22:21:48 GMT
Message-ID: <3knjhs$>
References: <3keavs$> <>

	I really did not want to get drawn into this, but here are my
two cents worth anyway.  Bob for years has been saying that consciousness
may depend on the *medium* that processes information, not just the
information processing itself.  In other words, although we may one
day produce a man with a silicon brain that is behaviorally identical
to other men, that man may not be conscious because consciousness
(as distinct from mere information processing) somehow requires
conventional neurochemistry to exist.

	If I may be so bold as to present Bob's case further, Bob believes
that consciousness can be scientifically investigated.  In the decades
ahead, we will design increasingly elaborate experiments that will
eventually allow us to state definitively what biophysical events are
responsible for consciousness.  We will then be able to state 
unambigously what kinds of hardware can be conscious, and what cannot.
Bob, have I represented your case correctly?

	I agree that consciousness (i.e. what people say they are
experiencing during specific stimuli) is amenable to scientfic
investigation.  The problem I have with Bob's thesis is as follows:
Imagine that a person incrementally modifies their brain in-situ
(the most likely scenario for "uploading" anyway) such that their
external behavior remains unchanged.  At what point could we
objectively say they had ceased to be conscious?  Since all
experiments on consciousness necessarily involve a paradigm
of stimulus and reported response, how could we ever distingish
the consciousness levels of two pieces of hardware (or "wetware")
that demonstrate the same stimulus-response relationship?

---Brian Wowk

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