X-Message-Number: 430 From att!usc.edu!more%girtab.usc.edu Sat Sep 7 15:28:45 PDT 1991 From: more% (Max More) Subject: Re: cryonics #410 - Re: Nano-neurons? To: kqb% I thoroughly agree with Simon Levy's comments against viewing the "mind" as software running on hardware. I also believe that Searle has an important point to the extent that there is a distinction to be made between being conscious and merely simulating consciousness. However, Searle's argument need not rule out uploading, nor the possibility of truly conscious and intelligent (contelligent) machines (if we would still refer to them as machines). What Searle's argument shows is that duplicating the behavior of a system at the most abstract level, or the "highest" level of behavior, is insufficient. If you want a computer to also have all teh qualitites of consciousness and awareness, it will be necessary to duplicate neural function at some deeper level. At what level? No one can say at this point. Rather than a simple hardware/software distincion, in the brain there are many possible levels, sometimes clearly distinct, in other cases overlapping. There's the level of the neuron, the membrane, the synapse, the activities inside the axon, collections of connected neurons, columnar formations, brain maps, brain systems, and the entire brain (an incomplete list). To create a contelligent being using non-biological hardware, we first need to know which if these levels must be respected in terms of function. Perhaps we must have components comparable in function to neurons, or maybe that's dispensable so long as we get the same function at a higher level (such as a brain system). On the other hand it might be necessary to have components functioning at deeper levels, such as that of the membrane. We will also need to ask ourselves: What do we care about in thinking of our continuity when being uploaded (or gradually shifting over to non-bio-logical hardware - i.e., transbiomorphosis)? Being made out of silcon, or optical processors, might allow us to be aware and intelligent, but might change the "qualia" of our experience, i.e., the subjective feel of our cognitive and sensory states. We might "feel" tactile sensations differently, or experience pleasurable and painful sensations in a novel way. Personally, I'm not worried about changes in qualia, so long as my new introspectively identifiable states are at least as (and preferably MORE) acute and refined than my old. Max More From att!usc.edu!more%girtab.usc.edu Sat Sep 7 15:56:54 PDT 1991 From: more% (Max More) Subject: Re: Directness of brain processes To: kqb% Some of the disagreement here seems to be over whether perception is "direct". Perhaps it would help if the people disagreeing on the issue gave some idea of what they take "direct" and "indirect" perception to involve. A lengthy discussion of this can be found in Objectivist philosopher David Kelley's book, The Evidence of the Senses. Kelley's book is of mixed quality, but he does have some knowledge of cognitive science (including an awareness of Gibson's work which, like Simon, I recommend). Max More Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=430