X-Message-Number: 5327
From: Peter Merel <>
Subject: SCI.CRYONICS Dawkins & Donaldson
Date: Mon, 4 Dec 1995 01:46:29 +1100 (EST)

Doug Skrecky writes,

>     The November 1995 issue of Scientific American contained an article
> entitled "God's Utility Function" by Richard Dawkins. [...]
>      Quote "Humans have always wondered about the meaning of life. 
> According to the author, life has no higher purpose than to perpetuate
> the survival of DNA." 

One wonders how much longer Dawkins will be able to dine out on
this theme.  One might say, in the same vein, that cars have no higher
purpose than to perpetuate the survival of the internal combustion
engine, or that computers have no higher purpose than to perpetuate the
survival of bits.  The furphy here is that life, cars or computers have
any innate purpose - imho such teleological rubbish doesn't belong in a
magazine that describes itself as "scientific". 

>     The idea that health and happiness are desirable is a self
> reproducing thought with a clear survival advantage. Only in humans does
> the intelligence exist where a real battle can now be joined with the
> ultimate master DNA. Let the war begin. 

Foo. Folks here know why I think memes are bunk; I'll add to the criticism
by suggesting that manifest destiny is bunk too. We're entering an era of
evolution-by-design. The basic cycle of this sort of evolution is:

Politics->Requirements->Design->Implementation->Consumption->Politics

What is the role of DNA in this cycle? It's just an implementation detail,
and it is being swiftly superceded. No, manifest destiny is something that
people who present drama impose on a fateless (and wonderful) world. Whether
it's Dawkins' brand of pseudo-scientific nihilism, or the CoS's reduction
into thetans and engrams, it's all the same to me: another way to fleece
the marks. 

Thomas Donaldson writes,


>Peter Merel and John Clark once more miss the point. My definition of "reality"
>was deliberate, and I am well aware that it would include the results of 
>some computer programs. Of course, if we look around us we see that there are
>many things which show no appearance of being computer programs (and if you
>want to claim that we are "already in a computer" you're welcome to do so, but
>to include those OTHER things will basically strip your claim of all empirical
>sense: yes, God may well exist, but he never shows himself in the world or in
>our minds?). 

By gum, I didn't suggest God exists, and neither that we are "in a computer",
whatever the hell that might imply. All I'm saying is that I think your 
preference for "real reality" over "virtual reality" is arbitrary. Models
in your head or models in a machine - what's the difference?

Consider, for example, a rainbow. Is it "really" real? It's plainly an
artifact of our senses; but on the other hand, it's something about
which we can reason and agree, a part of our common universe of
discourse. Virtual reality only permits us to create things about which
the same may be said. Can you explain the distinction you're trying to
draw in this light?

And as to being lumped with John Clark as "a nanoperson", if you can
tell me why nanotech is infeasible then I'll no longer consider it a
rational interest.  If you can't, then I can't see any reason for you to
distinguish between the "nanopeople" and yourself.

--

mailto:                 |            Accept Everything.         |

http://www.zip.com.au/~pete/           |            Reject Nothing.            |


Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=5327