X-Message-Number: 5652
Date:  Mon, 22 Jan 96 16:55:38 
From: Mike Perry <>
Subject: more memories

Dwight Jones has asked,
>
> what is the ESSENTIAL difference between successful
> cryonic rebuilding and regeneration from DNA seed?
> What is it about today's memories that we MUST
> [preserve] them to deem ourselves successful in this
> venture?
>
and has indicated he doesn't think existing postings have 
sufficiently addressed these questions. So I'll make another 
try.

I get the impression that he is asking about more than just 
whether memories have value, which he seems to concede. 
Clothing has value too, yet most of us would not take the 
trouble to preserve it for our reanimation, because it is 
replaceable; it is not "essential" to what we are. What is it, 
he asks, that makes memories "essential"? A number of 
answers come to mind. But I should start by noting that not 
all cryonicists consider memories essential_there are some 
who would appear to be satisfied with little more than a 
clone of themselves; however, I think most of us want our 
memories too (myself included). So now I'll consider why I 
think memories are "essential" 

I can think of three main reasons. (1) Simply a gut feeling. 
Memories are important; they enable us to relive the past, 
and enjoy again what we enjoyed once, or in the case of the 
less happy events, hopefully console ourselves with how 
the problems that existed then were finally overcome. This 
applies to *specific* memories--change them and you 
change the person (not like simply changing clothes!). To 
me my memories seem far more important and meaningful 
than some unknown sequence of genomic base pairs that I 
may possess in my cells. At best that gave rise to the 
hardware that has made it possible for me to exist, but it is 
not the essence of "me," which, I suspect, could also be 
expressed in quite different hardware (uploaded into a 
machine of the future, for instance). Apparently many 
people, however, do not feel that their memories are 
important at the level of "who-I-am." For those who don't 
the feeling may be impossible to communicate or 
comprehend, like the color red to one who is color-blind. 
(2) Memories are part of the historical record. This will 
have meaning to those who value the historical record. 
(Again, not everybody does, nor can understand why 
anybody would.) If the memories are lost, they cannot 
simply be "replaced" any more than our past history could 
simply be replaced with "new history" if it were lost. (Even 
if, by guesswork, we did manage to recreate the same 
information it would still lack the known connections with 
the past that the original had.) (3) A further ontological 
argument. Memories in some sense are necessary for a 
reasonable notion of survival of a "person" (i.e. observer). 
Immortality demands (again by a reasonable argument) an 
indefinitely *growing* set of memories. This is a rather 
intricate subject, and I won't try to give an adequate 
treatment here (more information available on request), just 
a few further thoughts, as follows.

Basically, the idea of "survival" involves some preservation 
of significant information from the past, which we might 
loosely call "memories," even though the term is usually 
understood in a more restrictive sense. Thus, your DNA, to 
the extent it is "significant," is in this category, i.e. could 
be said to comprise some of your "memories." (In fact I 
don't think all of the genome is significant; much of it 
apparently is not used at all--but that's a side issue.) If we 
deny that "memories" are "essential" we could also raise 
the issue that "not all of the DNA is essential." In fact, cut 
out any part of it whatever, even every bit of it_the 
missing part could be recreated, filled in by random events, 
or whatever, just as we might recreate or substitute for the 
more usual memories. But again, we'd forfeit the 
historicity, i.e. violate (2). In short I see no sharp dividing 
line between significant DNA information and more usual 
memories--or their degree of being "essential." On the 
other hand, I claim in (3) that "immortality demands an 
indefinitely *growing* set of memories." This is because 
only thereby could you track the passage of time and 
*subjectively* experience an unlimited amount of it. 
Otherwise, i.e. with some ceiling on the size of your 
memory, you are just a finite state automaton, doomed to 
(at best) infinitely often revisit one or more of a finite 
number of mental states. Subjectively, this could not satisfy 
my expectations for "immortality."  

Zen may teach that "memories are not essential to what 
makes you YOU" but I respectfully disagree. 


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