X-Message-Number: 7993
Date:  Wed, 02 Apr 97 12:52:56 
From: Mike Perry <>
Subject: Re: CryoNet #7985-#7992

Peter Merel writes, 
 
>Mike Perry writes, 
> 
>>A person is an FSM over finite stretches of time, but 
>>could also be a "growing automaton"--not limited to any 
>>fixed size if you take eternity into account. 
> 
>A growing automaton is an FSM? I take "finite state" to 
>mean, at the very least, recursively enumerable; how are 
>"growing automatons" recursively enumerable?  
 
I have made a confusing statement. A growing automaton 
is not an FSM--but behaves like one over a finite interval
of time. And the FSM model is still useful in describ-
ing reality, according to my understanding. It would only 
apply, strictly speaking, in localized domains. For instance, 
we could consider a bounded region of space over an 
interval of time (and this could be quite large, the whole 
known universe, for instance, but still it must be bounded). 
What is going on in that space (barring certain extremely 
weird possibilities) could be described by the behavior of 
an FSM which is subject to a sequence of inputs from the 
outside. The inputs need not conform to a computable se-
quence, however, so the successive states of the FSM al-
so would not have to be computable, if we suppose that 
time could be indefinitely extended, which we would 
have to do to raise the question of computability. (Finite
sequences are always computable, and finite sets re-
cursively enumerable.) Overall, it seems that reality 
can be described as an interconnection of FSMs--in-
finitely many of them. I would call this "digital"--so our
existence could be described as digital, even if the FSM
model only applies locally. 
 
>>As for the quantum computer, it seems to provide a way 
>>of getting results that are hard to explain unless you 
>>assume many, many computations are being done in 
>>parallel--a suggestion that many-worlds is true, i.e. the 
>>extra "worlds" really exist. (I'm not saying that all other 
>>interpretations are ruled out, however, but clearly the 
>>others have some explaining to do.)  
> 
>Weeelll, for Cramer, just as the cat is not truly in a 
>superposition, neither are the qbits; instead, you've got the 
>standard atemporal TI mechanisms linking the 
>measurement of the result with the initialization 
>of the computer. Since the TI doesn't suggest any 
>different result than the maths of QM, there's no great 
>mystery in this. 
 
Okay, I have to acknowledge that other interpretations than 
many-worlds do make the same predictions mathemati-
cally, and we must look harder for tests to distinguish 
them. More work would be needed to justify a claim that a 
successful quantum computer would "prove" many-worlds 
over its rivals. To me it still "tends to support" many 
worlds because that seems to provide a straightforward 
explanation of what is going on, and I have doubts about 
the other interpretations with their non-locality, atemporal-
ity, etc. I also wonder about possible, unsuspected equiva-
lences among the various interpretations. To me it seems 
entirely possible that two very different-looking interpreta-
tions could be equivalent at a deep enough level that both 
could be accepted, for philosophical purposes, as true. 
 
>>here is what Michael C. Price had to say (17 Feb. 1995,  
>>"Many-worlds FAQ,"  
>>http://www.airtime.co.uk/users/station/m-worlds.faq): 
 
[snip] 
 
The Cramer TI interpretation has some prominent physi-
cists supporting it, just as many-worlds does. I'll try to get 
in touch with Mike Price to see what he has to say.  
 
A few other comments: I've also read that many-worlds is 
the only version of QM that allows quantum gravity.  
Anybody know anything about this? Tipler in *The Phys-
ics of Immortality* says (p. 170): "Of course, the Many-
Worlds Interpretation may be wrong; many physicists think 
it is. But the overwhelming majority of people working on 
quantum cosmology subscribe to some version of the 
Many-Worlds Interpretation, simply because the mathe-
matics forces one to accept it." Finally, Nick Herbert in his 
well-known book *Quantum Reality* (1985) makes a 
mistake in his discussion of many-worlds. On p. 242 he 
says, "Although Bell's theorem does not apply to an Ever-
ett-style [many-worlds] universe, there's plenty of non-
locality present without it. Any model of reality in which a 
tiny event in the Andromeda galaxy can instantly split my 
reality into thousands of Xerox copies cannot by any 
stretch of the imagination be called 'local.'" The mistake 
here is that this assumes the split propagates instantan-
eously--but actually it is not necessary to assume it propa-
gates at more than light speed--locality is preserved. 
 
[snip] 
 
>For a look at all of the surviving interpretations, you 
>might try 
> 



>http://ring.aist.go.jp/archives/misc/NetNews/FAQandDOCS/alt.sci.physics.newtheories/Measurement_in_quantum_mechanics_FAQ
 
Thanks for the reference 
 
 
re Thomas Donaldson 
 
Thomas questions whether mathematics would be universal 
to "advanced" aliens, and uses this to call into question my 
idea of a universal language. To me the potential, at least, 
to develop mathematics to an arbitrary level is a prerequi-
site for being considered "advanced"--impose a ceiling of 
some kind and your aliens are forever limited and fail what 
I would consider a crucial test of being "advanced." In 
particular the aliens should, after sufficient advancement, 
understand the concept of computable function and should 
have general-purpose computers, equivalent to a universal 
Turing machine. 
 
One trend in our own civilization is that mathematics is a 
cumulative enterprise--branches once developed do not 
lose relevance or interest over time, even when we find 
them inadequate in certain circumstances, as with Euclid-
ean geometry. This argues against the thought that some-
day we might "forget" something we now consider impor-
tant, such as the prime numbers or computable functions. It 
also suggests that alien civilizations would, given sufficient 
time, master the same mathematics we have mastered, and 
retain this knowledge once acquired. 
 
Thomas also wrote,  
 
>I am doubting the Turing Test, not just as a test of 
>consciousness but as a test of intelligent behavior. 
 
To me, passing the Turing Test would demonstrate intelli-
gence. This doesn't mean "demonstrate it in all possible 
ways" however. Thomas, is this what you had in mind? 
 
 
Mike Perry 
 
http://www.alcor.org

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