X-Message-Number: 8030
From:  (Mike C.)
Subject: Cryonics/Consciousness/Change (Re: CryoNet #8017 - #8024
Date: Wed, 9 Apr 1997 23:56:01 -0400

Hi Mike, 
your post was full of interesting info.
I enjoyed reading it.

>Message #8020
>Date:  Tue, 08 Apr 97 12:44:27 
>From: Mike Perry <>
>Subject: Re: CryoNet #8014 - #8016
>
>Robin Hanson wrote (#8014),
> 
>> The lack of interest by most scientists in cryonics may thus perhaps
>> be explained by their placing a low value on the potential benefit of
>> revival, rather than on their placing an especially low probability on
>> this possibility (say <5%).  This low value on revival is a new thing.  
>> 
>
>Cryonics offers the possibility of extended life in a state of mental 
>alertness. 

I had not heard it offerred mental alertness, please explain.

>
> Bob Ettinger wrote (#8015),
>
>> Mike Perry (#8009-8013) says certain things that seem somewhat inconsistent
>> to me. 
>> 
>> In #8009 he says we can experiment to locate the seat of feeling, and
>> mentions the conjecture that it is in the midbrain-thalamic reticular
>> formation. But then in #8010 the thrust of his discussion is that
>> consciousness may be a matter of degree, and that a dim level of

>> consciousness might be ascribed to simple, goal-seeking automata such as Grey
>> Walter's turtles. 
>> 
>> These two notions do not fit well together. If the mammalian brain has a
>> definite seat of feeling--whether localized or distributed in the brain or
>> its functions--then the rest of the brain and its functions (most of it) is

>> presumably outside of feeling, or more or less independent of it. And if most
>> of the human brain is unfeeling, then surely we have no reason to ascribe
>> feeling to a simple automaton.
>> 

It seems to me a seat refers to a localized( spacially compacted) area
where a majority of thought occurrs.
Like saying the brain stem thinks but not as much as the Hypothamamus
(is that correct?).

>
>One way to resolve the apparent inconsistency is to think about what 
>"agent" is involved. Suppose, as a thought experiment, that the brain 
>of a person (not necessarily human, but a conscious being) is divided 
>into regions A and B that correspond to different entities or 
>"agents." This person communicates in English, and 

>generally behaves and functions enough like a human that its consciousness can
>be tested in much the same way--plus we have advanced technology as 
>needed. It is found that (1) region A is always active when the person is 
>conscious, (2) when A is inactive the person is never conscious, and 
>(3) A is the smallest possible region of the brain with these 
>properties. So 
>A, to all appearances, is the "seat of consciousness." By analysis, though, 
>it is found that B is very much like A, except that B *only* 
>communicates with A. When A is inactive, B may be active, but it has 
>no "hookup" with the outside world and its activity is not normally 
>apparent. In effect B is a fully conscious entity in its own right, 
>but it is not the "person" that is represented in A. A uses B as a 
>"slave"--with no direct awareness of any "feelings" B may 
>have.

I agree with that.
I look to an other perspective of my self for a second opinion.

>
> I've heard of people who "work" problems when not consciously aware.
>They have "B-regions" that are actually conscious, to some degree, but it
isn't 
>"their" consciousness.

Well... yea, you can say that.
I'm tired of trying to be exact with people 
when it come to personal identity.

>
>Following this train of thought, we might 
>imagine that much or all of the body's CNS is capable of consciousness to 
>some extent, yet it isn't the "seat of consciousness" to the person 
>who inhabits that body.

Some generalists may say the CNS is the recliner of conciousness 
as opposed to the pillowed head rest of conciousness.

>
>In fact, there is an interesting conjecture in *The Hedonistic 
>Neuron* (A. Harry Klopf, Hemisphere, 1982) along these lines. After 
>hypothesizing that the midbrain-thalamic reticular formation
>(MTRF) is the seat of consciousness, the author goes on to say (p. 
>53): "The other brain structures probably experience pleasure and 
>pain but, apparently, the nature of psychic fields is such that those 
>fields associated with other brain structures do not significantly 
>interact with the psychic field of the MTRF. 

They do not have enough signaling power 
to accept personal responsibility for it.
Like how a citizen may do a thing while the county, state, country, etc 
gets the credit.

>Thus, we are no more 
>aware of the psychic field associated with our own cortex, for 
>example, than we are of the psychic field associated with someone 
>else's cortex." 

What is the range?

>
>To Thomas Donaldson, re #8016:
>
>I could imagine a future in which we are very much more advanced than 
>we are today, with many things in our "repertoire" that might be as 
>incomprehensible to us now, say, as nuclear physics is to a frog. 

Do we know what a frog thinks about?
May be it has no thing better to do than contemplate particle physics.
Particles, large or small, portray most basic physical interactions.
I got bored so thats what I did, 
I sat and thought about what was happening.

>
>Now, suppose we go further in our speculation and allow that future 
>posthumans will also find no use for human historical information, 
>and so will even discard that. If that is allowed, then effectively we 
>are dead meat because what are our personal details except human 
>historical information of a certain type? So really our very 
>survival--as posthuman continuers of our present selves--depends on 
>historical information (certain information at any rate) being regarded
>as valuable enough to be preserved indefinitely.

I place more emphasis on continuing the processing of info 
than on what has been processed.
I do realize uses of knowledge of the past, 
but need roots in the present.

>
>As for me, I have fond memories of learning and doing math,
>that I hope will survive in my 
>posthuman period; this definitely includes comprehension of what I 
>was doing! If I should change my mind later and want to 
>discard these things, you could raise the question whether it is 
>still "me."

I do not care too much if I am still me, 
I am who I am.
I like to change.
If I could not change and let go of thing holding me down 
I could not ascend without pulling up excess baggage and wasting energy.
If I could not change I could not beome better.
Please be careful not to let things outlive their usefullness.
That means more to find use for things you have 
than ditch things you do not use.
Idle time is the devils time.

U.Sov., Scott, Mike, Whatever you want to call me,
A rose by any other name...

Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=8030