X-Message-Number: 8118 Subject: CRYONICS Consciousness dis-explained Date: Mon, 21 Apr 1997 10:59:29 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" <> > From: > 2. Perry Metzger (#8106) has so many things wrong that I'll just bother with > one clarification, mainly for the benefit of newcomers. "Perry Metzger says so many things that I can't argue with very well that I'll ignore most of them". [...] > 3. Emulations come in many varieties. At one extreme, you might (perhaps) in > principle be emulated by a super-beam-me-up-machine which would copy you atom > for atom, all configured precisely right. Whether this copy would be "you" > remains an open question, but it certainly would be a human being and could > live in our world. Note that to do this simulation, Ettinger argues you need merely COPY THE PERSON, not their environment. Keep that in mind. > In order for a computer simulation putatively to be you, and to carry on with > your life, the requirements are enormous and impossible in practice in any > foreseeable future, perhaps even impossible in principle, but the thought > experiment could still be useful. > It would be necessary to know the initial values of every variable or > parameter in your anatomy and physiology, and also in your environment--to > the desired degree of completeness and accuracy. Note that for the computer, he requires that you know the person's environment -- not a requirement he gave for the "Atom by Atom" version. [Lets look for a few moments at how easily satirized Ettinger's thesis here is.] > Now a computer (with its program and data store) just produces (after various > intermediary steps) a sequence of new numbers, which are to be associated > with the successive values of the variables or parameters in the person A brain (with its neurons and neurochemicals) just produces (after various intermediary steps) a sequence of new chemical states, which are to be associated with the successive states or parameters in the person > Probably most people will say right here that the info proposition > is silly--that a succession of numbers on a tape or on sheaves of > paper can't be a person, Probably most poeple will say right here that the info proposition is silly -- that a succession of chemical states in squish neural tissue can't be a person > can't have subjective experiences for example. can't have subjective experiences, for example. > But the info people have the courage to accept whatever they think > is logical, regardless of plausibility or intuition. But the "brains are conscious" people have the courage to accept whatever they think is logical, regardless of plausibility or intuition. > As I have said many times, the information paradigm has NOT been > proven, but some info folk seem willing to accept it as an axiom, > not seeing any acceptable alternative. As I have said many times, the "your brain is the seat of consciousness" paradigm has NOT been proven, but some info folk seem willing to accept it as an axiom, not seeing any acceptable alternative. [taking a step back out of satire for a moment] > A simulated person, in a simulated world, might be able to do such things. If I build a "brain simulator" of Robert Ettinger, use nanotechnology to make it small enough to fit inside a cranium, and fiendishly take out Robert Ettinger's brain using surgery and replace it with the simulator, attaching the simulator to all the sensory and motor nerves attached to his brain before closing the skull, WHO WILL KNOW that the simulated system isn't Robert Ettinger? Let us say that we then attach Robert Ettinger's brain, fiendishly kept alive in a life support tank, to a computer virtual reality system such as we are now starting to be able to build, connecting all the motor and sensory nerves up such that Robert Ettinger's brain thinks it is still connected to the world. At this point, presumably, Robert Ettinger would have to argue that his "real brain" wasn't conscious -- wasn't a "Real Human Being" -- since it was "only operating in a simulated universe, and we all know that numbers aren't reality", or some such. Referring somewhat overconfidently to his own writing, Ettinger says: > I wonder if this will shake anybody's confidence in the more extreme versions > of the information paradigm? Of course not, just as surely as you will ignore the obvious argument we are making here. To argue that a computer can't simulate you, Mr. Ettinger, you are going to have to argue that I cannot -- *CANNOT* -- build a computer that I could attach to your motor and sensory neurons that would be functionally indistinguishable from your brain, that could function as you well enough that no one would know that you had been operated on and that your "Real" brain was gone. Please address this. It is the core -- the entirety -- of the problem with your thesis. Perry Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=8118