X-Message-Number: 8124
Date: 22 Apr 97 11:41:29 EDT
From: "Robert C. Ettinger" <>
Subject: CRYONICS nut

In dealing with the messages of people like Metzger, there is obviously a point

of rapidly diminishing returns, now long past. But again, mainly for the benefit
of newcomers, I'll respond briefly to what he says (#8118) is the nut of the
argument.

He implies (last paragraph) that my thesis is that a computer cannot simulate a

person, and he says that the core of the problem with my thesis is that I cannot
prove that it would be impossible to build a computer that could replace my
brain with no change in observed behavior.

As usual, he simply has not been paying attention, and has the requirements
backward. 


I have never said it is impossible for a computer to simulate a person, nor that
(a different thing) it would be impossible for a computer successfully to
pretend to be a person or a particular person, nor that a computer could not be
conscious. What I have said is:

1. We do not yet understand the physical basis of feeling and consciousness in
mammals. Until we do, it is premature to ASSUME that a computer (similar to

present computers, but faster and with more memory) could or would have feeling.
The burden of proof is on those who claim something not yet known.


2. The "information paradigm" holds that all systems and events, in all of their
important aspects, and in particular our own subjective lives, consist
essentially of information and the processing of information.  Once more, this
is only an assertion or postulate, not a proven fact, however plausible it may
seem to some. 

In particular, it seems to me entirely possible that subjectivity (feeling,
qualia) may depend on specific physical systems in the brain--that feeling lies

in a physical condition or in physical events, not just relations among symbols.


Sometimes the info people take refuge in their own versions of solipsism, saying
that we can never know for sure whether another individual--even another

human--is conscious, and therefore we must judge entirely on outward appearances
(Turing Test). And I have responded many times that:

a) We are  NOT restricted to observing external behavior. We can study the
physiology of mammals, which should finally lead to understanding of feeling in
mammals. Once we have this understanding, we will be in a better position to
judge whether the requirements of feeling limit it to an organic substrate, or
to some broader class of materials, or whether the information paradigm  gains
support; and

b) Any fool can plainly see that an observer can be fooled. A few present
programs, in a very restricted context, pretending to be people,  fool some of
the people some of the time; more sophisticated ones of the future certainly
will be able to fool most of the people most of the time. If it looks like a
duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it still might be something
that German artisans produced a century ago, a clockwork duck. In other words,
the Turing Test is garbage. 

Robert Ettinger

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