X-Message-Number: 8124 Date: 22 Apr 97 11:41:29 EDT From: "Robert C. Ettinger" <> Subject: CRYONICS nut In dealing with the messages of people like Metzger, there is obviously a point of rapidly diminishing returns, now long past. But again, mainly for the benefit of newcomers, I'll respond briefly to what he says (#8118) is the nut of the argument. He implies (last paragraph) that my thesis is that a computer cannot simulate a person, and he says that the core of the problem with my thesis is that I cannot prove that it would be impossible to build a computer that could replace my brain with no change in observed behavior. As usual, he simply has not been paying attention, and has the requirements backward. I have never said it is impossible for a computer to simulate a person, nor that (a different thing) it would be impossible for a computer successfully to pretend to be a person or a particular person, nor that a computer could not be conscious. What I have said is: 1. We do not yet understand the physical basis of feeling and consciousness in mammals. Until we do, it is premature to ASSUME that a computer (similar to present computers, but faster and with more memory) could or would have feeling. The burden of proof is on those who claim something not yet known. 2. The "information paradigm" holds that all systems and events, in all of their important aspects, and in particular our own subjective lives, consist essentially of information and the processing of information. Once more, this is only an assertion or postulate, not a proven fact, however plausible it may seem to some. In particular, it seems to me entirely possible that subjectivity (feeling, qualia) may depend on specific physical systems in the brain--that feeling lies in a physical condition or in physical events, not just relations among symbols. Sometimes the info people take refuge in their own versions of solipsism, saying that we can never know for sure whether another individual--even another human--is conscious, and therefore we must judge entirely on outward appearances (Turing Test). And I have responded many times that: a) We are NOT restricted to observing external behavior. We can study the physiology of mammals, which should finally lead to understanding of feeling in mammals. Once we have this understanding, we will be in a better position to judge whether the requirements of feeling limit it to an organic substrate, or to some broader class of materials, or whether the information paradigm gains support; and b) Any fool can plainly see that an observer can be fooled. A few present programs, in a very restricted context, pretending to be people, fool some of the people some of the time; more sophisticated ones of the future certainly will be able to fool most of the people most of the time. If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it still might be something that German artisans produced a century ago, a clockwork duck. In other words, the Turing Test is garbage. Robert Ettinger Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=8124