X-Message-Number: 8161
From: 
Date: Thu, 1 May 1997 17:22:13 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: CRYONICS Metzger in a rut

I have, in part, the same complaints against Metzger that he (#8157)
expressed against me. I say he is not responsive to my statements; he does
not stick to the issues; he is not arguing against what I say, but against
some straw man that exists only in his own imagination; he dodges the issues
and changes the subject. So let's look again at particulars.

1. He complains that I refuse to answer his question,  whether I can prove I
am in the "real" world. How tiresome and lacking in perception! My postings
have OBVIOUSLY accepted--as a basis for discussion--the possibility that all
of us are living in a simulation. I doubt it, because, for reasons I have
repeatedly stated, I doubt that a simulation could have subjective
experiences; but I don't deny the long-shot possibility, and my disussions
have clearly assumed that it is possible. 

2. He says I have been "pulling Vanevar Bushes" and that I keep claiming
things about computers that aren't true, and that I have been "spewing
nonsense" and reading "cheap science fiction" and on and on. And how does he
back up these hormonal accusations? By saying I was wrong that a cascade of
simulations and subsimulations in a computer would effectively make it stop
or crash. 

Whether "crash" was a well chosen word is at most, to use Metzger's own
expression, a matter of "silly semantics." If the computer effectively stops
or freezes up, that's close enough to a crash for me. Now again, would it
effectively stop? 

I pointed out that, for reasons previously discussed, if we could create a
simulated world with simulated people, those simulations would almost surely
produce large numbers of somewhat different subsimulations, etc. If we have
just one real computer, clearly it could not support such a cascade without
slowing down to near zero. Every event in every sim, subsim,
subsubsim....would have to correspond to a physical change of state in the
single real, original computer. A limited computer, in limited time, cannot
produce an unlimited number of different subsimulations.

Metzger asks, "So? Why is this interesting?" Could anything be more obvious?
 The general discussion concerned the possibility of real people "uploading"
and carrying on their lives as simulations. (Uploading into silicon and
carrying on in the real world is a separate discussion.) If the computer
effectively freezes up, they can't do it, even if there were no other
problem. (And there are plenty of other problems.)

Then he goes on, against the freeze-up problem, by saying you can't build an
unlimited number of computers on earth. In one of his favorite phrases, So
what? How is this relevant to my point? 

He goes on to ask why would the original computer crash if the simulated
atoms were in the form of a computer, but not if the simulated atoms were in
the form of a rock. The answer is that a simulated rock can't produce
subsimulations, but a simulated computer can.

He then continues to attempt to defend his rejection of the subsim problem by
saying  you can trade memory for time. That is exactly MY point. With more
and more work to do, it takes longer and longer. The single, original
computer MUST run slower and slower (relative to demand) as more and more
simulations and subsimulations are generated; pretty soon (VERY soon) the
whole thing essentially grinds to a halt.

3. I pointed out that, if simulated worlds with simulated people were really
possible (which I don't believe), we should probably have zillions of
subsimulated worlds, for much the same reasons that we might produce one in
the first place. If there is one real world and zillions of simulations, and
if we have no way of telling which we are in, then almost certainly we are in
a simulation. (The probability of being in the real world is 1/zillion.)
Connecting this with the necessary possibility of 2-way communication between
the programmer and the simulated people, I pointed out that any real believer
in the feasibility of such simulations ought to be "praying" (trying to
communicate with his programmer) with all his might. 

He asks, "Why?" Again, could anything be more obvious?

Then he asks, should the fish in his "Fish & Sharks" virtual world have
prayed to him? Certainly--if they were intelligent beings with feelings,
which they were not.

I haven't touched all of the bases, but that's enough for now.

Robert Ettinger

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