X-Message-Number: 8245 Date: Mon, 26 May 97 13:22:00 From: Mike Perry <> Subject: Pancritical rationalism, testability, falsifiability Tim Freeman, #8241, has some interesting arguments as to how, in practice, we might avoid having to adopt unfalsifiable hypotheses. His method is based on pancritical rationalism, in which choices of actions and plans are evaluated, in addition to beliefs. We can focus, then, on our behavior and not have to take a stand on whether we believe something that is not provable or disprovable. He offers an argument for "valuing tomorrow's consequences" of one's actions today, which is a de facto rejection of the day-person hypothesis, without explicitly referring to it. This argument is based on evolutionary considerations: the species will thrive better if we in fact (and humans in general) choose this course rather than acting as if our lives will end as soon as we sleep. I think this is a worthy effort, but I have some criticism. Pancritical rationalism may provide a way to avoid unfalsifiable hypotheses, but I think, in this case, it has resulted in an unnatural approach. (It might be applied differently to come up with a different rationale, however.) To simply take the stand: "I *do* survive a period of unconsciousness, I *will* be present in the world tomorrow (barring something more drastic than sleep), therefore *I* have a direct, vested interest in the consequences of my actions today" seems much more reasonable to me. (One thought that goes along with this is that I am not really much interested in "survival of the species" unless I will participate in that survival, directly.) But this, in turn, invokes the "continuation" hypothesis (my terminology) that the day person-hypothesis is false, i.e. that we do, in fact, survive periods of unconsciousness. Neither hypothesis is falsifiable, we might say. However, in actuality, from *my* perspective they are falsifiable, based on my understanding of what a person is. That depends in turn, however, on the information paradigm, on regarding a person as like a program running on a hardware device, that can be restarted after a period of inactivity or "shutdown," etc. On that basis clearly the continuation hypothesis is valid, and the day-person hypothesis is not. (Presumably, then, I would not be inconsistent with pancritical rationalism if I rejected the day-person hypothesis outright, given this view.) But not everybody will see it that way, or some other way that would resolve the question, so for the world at large it seems that both hypotheses must be considered unfalsifiable. There are other hypotheses that, while unfalsifiable in a strict sense, seem at least to be partially testable. The claim that supernatural powers or forces exist is one such hypothesis. Though perhaps it can never be fully tested, I think the scientific evidence against it is good, and I feel justified in rejecting it. I take my rejection as a "working hypothesis" and not a dogmatic certainty, and remain open to any evidence that might decide the question either way. More generally, I try to replace "beliefs" by "working hypotheses" to remain open to whatever the evidence will show, while at the same time enjoying the advantages of taking a definite stand. Then there is the sort of hypothesis, such as that Perry Metzger's invisible bunny exists, which might be said to have really nothing going for or against it, in the way of experimental evidence. In other words it is truly, totally untestable. But this can be thrown out on grounds of Occam's razor, if nothing else. Mike Perry Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=8245