X-Message-Number: 8300
Date: Mon, 09 Jun 1997 09:09:46 -0700
From: Peter Merel <>
Subject: Bits or Souls?

Bob Ettinger writes in a speculative mode,

>First, Feinberg and others have suggested that faster-than-light signals may
>indeed be possible through tachyons, although the possible paradoxes have not
>been dealt with satisfactorily, as far as I know.

Trouble with tachyons, if there are any such beasts, is observing them. Much 
of the mathematics that describe physical laws can be used to give rise to 
improbable effects, especially with regard to infinities (tachyons tend 
towards an infinite speed as their energy drops ...). Many of these 
improbables are so empirically disasterous that it is assumed they are 
artifacts of the imperfection of our understanding, and so they are 
"normalized" out. Tachyons, as I recall, are very much beasts of the "show 
me one" realm, being a possible solution to (general?) relativity, but not
necessarily an accessible one.

That said, my physics isn't strong - does anyone know any different?

>Second, what about Mach and centripetal force? Supposedly, a rotating body
>would not exhibit this effect in the absence of the distant stars, which
>provide a reference frame for the rotation. How does this become a local
>effect?

The same has been said of inertia, I recall. I believe Cramer's 
interpretation, at least, provides a useful (non-local) explanation of such, 
but I reserve the right to fold under pressure - I gave the Cramer URLs a 
while back, and don't know any more than you'll find there.

>He thinks some of the quantum
>rules are statistical only, not applying to actual individual particles. 

Regrettably (?) the "spooky action at a distance" bit has been observed in
experiments that deal with one or two particles at a time - Aspect and
subsequent tests of Bell work like this. Of course the effects are
seen only after multiple runs - they are effects in the aggregate - but 
explaining these empirical effects as "only statistics" seems to be to 
dismiss rather than to account for them.

--

Peter C. McCluskey writes,

> It is fairly easy to write a simulation such that no behavior of the
>simulated entities can crash the simulation -

That may be, but it's not possible to prove - cf. the General Halting 
Problem in any Computability textbook. I quite agree with you that
our Bob is off the beam with this "there would be bugs ..." bit, but I 
think that the disagreement here is philosophical rather than logical.
To we folk who regard information as a physical property, Bob's position 
looks irrational, but to folk who regard identity as a physical property,
the info position looks irrational. Interesting, ain't it? Maybe we should 
investigate the ascription of physicality a little more, rather than 
keep wasting bits on slanging ...

Peter Merel.

--
10022 Paseo Montril #224 San Diego CA 92129
Telephone 619 484 4728 mailto:

Rate This Message: http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/rate.cgi?msg=8300