X-Message-Number: 9205
Date:  Wed, 25 Feb 98 18:06:36 
From: Mike Perry <>
Subject: Re: CryoNet #9201

Bob Ettinger writes
> 
> With all due respect to Mike Perry (and he is due a lot), his # 9195 seems to
> me to be very much over-simplified. 
> 
> He seems to be saying, more or less,  that memory or memories should be
> regarded as essential to survival. But this sort of criterion is at least as
> vulnerable as others to questions of accuracy, duplication, fidelity,
> continuity, etc. 
> 
Well, I didn't say that questions couldn't be raised. So here goes.

> For one thing, suppose (as in the movie TOTAL RECALL) that false memories are

> somehow substituted for your real ones. The protagonist in the movie says, "If
> I'm not me, then who the hell am I?" If memory MAKES or defines the
> individual, then the protagonist was indeed "me"--meaning the person
> identified by those false memories. In other words, the memories were "false"
> only by the historical criterion, and everyone knows history is bunk.
> 
This is one issue I address at some length in my book, *Forever for 
All*. I don't say "history is bunk." But I do accept some version of 
parallel worlds (not necessarily the famous many-worlds theory of 
Everett; I am less specific in the requirements, but maintain that 
some version is likely to hold, and I lean toward Everett's). There
is a chapter of my 
book devoted to this too. The upshot is that all possible histories, 
over large limits, are real. Crazy as it may seem, there aren't 
really any truly "false" memories, barring such problems as logically 
contradictory memories. I allow that, in extreme cases, a person 
might be what I call "xenontic," literally a traveler from some other 
universe whose history is different from ours, as defined by the 
memories they have, i.e. their memories could be 
contrary to the facts of our history. They would presumably have some 
adjustment problems, and I don't recommend arbitrary tinkering with 
one's memories (which is possible today, in a limited 
way, but ought to be more feasible in the future) to create such an 
alternate self.
   
> Certainly the example above is itself oversimplified; Mike did not say, and
> probably no one believes, that memory is the SOLE criterion of identity or
> survival. But if it is the main one, or even a necessary one, the problem
> alluded to exists.
> 

> Another example of a problem shared by the memory criterion: Suppose "you" are
> thawed out and repaired, or reconstituted, or duplicated, or whatever--but
> with the memories you had at a much earlier date, not at time of freezing or
> whatever. Have "you" survived? 
> 
I deal with this too. It's a variation of what has been called the 
"age-regression problem." Based on this it is possible that "you" at 
one stage in your life could give rise to more than one continuer 
later, which I don't see as a fundamental problem. Loss of memories
is another problem. Sometimes this does not 
seem serious. I lose a great deal of minor information each time I 
sweep a rug, pertaining to the configuration of dust particles I can 
see on the floor, etc., but it doesn't bother me, and in fact seems a 
good thing. The way I deal with this issue, and loss or alteration
of memories more generally, involves what 
I call "convergence to an ideal self," a process that takes place 
over infinite (subjective) time, assuming that literal immortality
is achievable. Some information can be lost or changed along 
the way, but a growing body must endure permanently, to define
the continuing individual.
  
> It isn't good enough to shrug and say it's a matter of personal opinion or
> personal values, or that we can never know the "real" answer, or that there
> isn't any "true" answer. It is certainly possible that the final answer, when
> we find it, will be unpalatable, but there IS an answer. Every question,
> SUFFICIENTLY WELL FORMED, has an unambiguous, objective answer. (That is my
> "religion" at any rate.)    
> 

> I'm certainly not complaining about speculation--the more the better, provided

> it is followed by analysis and experiment. But let's remember that speculation
> should not be held as dogma or anything close to it.
>
In the book I offer "working hypotheses" rather than 
"dogma". But some firm positions are taken, for which I try to
give adequate reasons. Recently I finished a rough draft of the book.
I'm trying to make it less "rough" by tidying up references and
other minor editing; then I hope to make it available for anyone
wishing to review it, with due acknowledgement to be given
for usable feedback.

Mike Perry

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